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With the rise of China, scholars once again face great questions in 
global history—questions about the rise of the West, but also its potential
relative decline.1  What role has law played in the rise and fall of global 
powers?  There are, indeed, scholars who believe that legal institutions
can determine the economic fate of civilizations and societies.2 Many have 
focused in particular on the role of property rights in England’s rise to
global preeminence in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,3 an issue
that captured academic attention as early as Max Weber and continues to 
do so today.4  This Article sheds new light on this debate by focusing on 
1. On the “rise of the West,” see generally WILLIAM H. MCNEILL, THE RISE OF 
THE WEST: A HISTORY OF THE HUMAN COMMUNITY (1963); E. L. JONES, THE EUROPEAN
MIRACLE: ENVIRONMENTS, ECONOMIES AND GEOPOLITICS IN THE HISTORY OF EUROPE AND
ASIA (2d ed. 1981); and DAVID S. LANDES, THE WEALTH AND POVERTY OF NATIONS:
WHY SOME ARE SO RICH AND SOME SO POOR (1998). For a discussion on potential 
decline, see IAN MORRIS, WHY THE WEST RULES—FOR NOW: THE PATTERNS OF HISTORY,
AND WHAT THEY REVEAL ABOUT THE FUTURE (2010).  China’s rise poses a significant 
challenge to theories of economic development established on the “rise of the west” 
presumption. See, e.g., Frank K. Upham, From Demsetz to Deng: Speculations on the 
Implications of Chinese Growth For Law And Development Theory, 41 N.Y.U. J. INT’L 
L. & POL. 551 (2009); Donald C. Clarke, Economic Development and the Rights 
Hypothesis: The China Problem, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 89 (2003); Tom Ginsburg, Does 
Law Matter for Economic Development? Evidence from East Asia, 34 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 829 (2000). 
2. See generally  TIMUR KURAN, THE LONG DIVERGENCE: HOW ISLAMIC LAW 
HELD BACK THE MIDDLE EAST (2011); HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL:
WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE (2000); Rafael
La Porta, et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. OF POL. ECON. 1113 (1998); DOUGLASS C.
NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990).
For a more critical perspective, see Ralf Michaels, The Second Wave of Comparative 
Law and Economics?, 59 U. TORONTO L.J. 197 (2009); Upham, supra note 1; see, e.g., 
Clarke, supra note 1, at 89–90; David M. Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-
Estrangement: Some Reflections on the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the 
United States, WIS. L. REV. 1062, 1075–76 (1974).  For a summary of this considerable 
interdisciplinary literature, see Kevin E. Davis & Michael J. Trebilcock, The Relationship 
Between Law and Development: Optimists versus Skeptics, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 895, 895– 
96 (2008).
3. For traditional statements on the English divergence, see DOUGLASS C. NORTH
& ROBERT PAUL THOMAS, THE RISE OF THE WESTERN WORLD: A NEW ECONOMIC 
HISTORY 1–18 (1973); E.A. WRIGLEY, POVERTY, PROGRESS AND POPULATION 44–60 
(2004). A more recent view is that divergence between England and China did not occur
until the nineteenth century.  See, e.g., KENNETH POMERANZ, THE GREAT DIVERGENCE:
EUROPE, CHINA, AND THE MAKING OF THE MODERN WORLD ECONOMY 31 (2000). For a 
reasonably comprehensive survey of the relevant literature, see POMERANZ, supra, at 3– 
15, 31. 
4. The relevant literature is vast.  See, e.g., MAX WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY 
AND SOCIETY (Max Rheinstein ed., 1954); NORTH & THOMAS, supra note 3, at 1–8; THE 
BRENNER DEBATE 10–63 (T.H. Aston & C.H.E. Philpin eds., 1985); Daron Acemoglu, 
Simon Johnson & James Robinson, The Rise of Europe: Atlantic Trade, Institutional 
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one of the great stories of relative decline in global history: The decline
of China from one of the richest and most powerful countries in the
sixteenth century to one overwhelmed by European, particularly English, 
economic and military superiority in the nineteenth.5 
In recent years, the economic history field has undergone a sea change: 
Numerous senior historians who previously focused only on Europe
have shifted their attention to global comparisons, particularly between
Northwestern Europe and Eastern China.6  The break from traditional 
Eurocentrism is commendable in itself, but more importantly, it has
brought well-deserved attention to the dramatic ethno-cultural and political
consequences of the Sino-English economic divergence.7 Whereas 
Europeans marveled at China’s social and economic complexity even in 
the late seventeenth century,8 by the Opium War, England’s economic 
strength was undeniably superior.  The gap continued to grow for a century,
as China was not able to successfully industrialize until the Communist
era.9  The economic divergence had massive psychological and material 
consequences: Chinese anguish over her persistent industrial and military 
ineptitude contributed heavily to the century-long stretch of self-doubt
and cultural chaos that followed, starting with the crumbling of its
traditional value-system and ending with the Communist revolution.10 
Change, and Economic Growth, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 546, 546–72 (2005); CHARLES I.
JONES, INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMIC GROWTH 121 (2d ed., 2002). 
5. POMERANZ, supra note 3, at 11–12. 
6. Brenner, for example, moved from his focus on the Anglo-French comparison 
to the Anglo-Chinese comparison, see THE BRENNER DEBATE supra note 4; and Robert
Brenner & Christopher Isett, England’s Divergence from China’s Yangtze Delta: 
Property Relations, Microeconomics, and Patterns of Development, 61 J. ASIAN STUD. 
609 (2002). Robert Allen and Joel Mokyr have also adopted a more global perspective 
that pays much attention to China. See generally ROBERT C. ALLEN, THE BRITISH INDUSTRIAL 
REVOLUTION IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE (2009); Joel Mokyr, Why Was the Industrial 
Revolution a European Phenomenon?, 10 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 27 (2003). 
7. POMERANZ, supra note 3, at 3–15. 
8. See JONATHAN D. SPENCE, THE CHAN’S GREAT CONTINENT: CHINA IN WESTERN
MINDS 19–51 (1998).
9. POMERANZ, supra note 3, at 229, 239 (setting the date of divergence in the 
early nineteenth century).
10. The psychological and ideological damage inflicted by the perception of 
material weakness is a prevalent theme in the modern Chinese history field. See, e.g., 
MARY CLABOUGH WRIGHT, THE LAST STAND OF CHINESE CONSERVATISM: THE T’UNG-
CHIH RESTORATION, 1862–1874, at 5–7 (1957); BENJAMIN SCHWARTZ, IN SEARCH OF
WEALTH AND POWER: YEN FU AND THE WEST 15, 18, 247 (1964); 1 JOHN KING FAIRBANK,
TRADE AND DIPLOMACY ON THE CHINA COAST: THE OPENING OF THE TREATY PORTS,
1842–1854 (1953); JOSEPH R. LEVENSON, CONFUCIAN CHINA AND ITS MODERN FATE: A
TRILOGY (1968).  It is highly questionable, however, whether China’s modern intellectual
 131





   
 
 
   










      
  
  
    
       
   
   
 






    
 
  
      
       
    
   
 
The causes of China’s relative decline are, however, hardly obvious. 
In fact, recent scholarship has shown that England, the richest European
economy, and the “Chinese core” shared many fundamental economic 
characteristics in the later eighteenth century: both possessed significant
urbanization and highly developed markets, allowing much of their rural
population to “produce for the market.”11 In both economies, households
and individuals displayed rational, interest-based decision-making.12 
Finally, contrary to some influential assumptions, both societies recognized
the private ownership of property, both real and personal.13 
These fundamental similarities make China’s relative decline all the 
more intriguing, even as they narrow the range of viable explanations. 
Despite this higher “standard of proof,” there are no shortage of candidates, 
including, among many others.  The peculiar nature of European science,14 
China’s population growth,15 her lack of natural resources and foreign 
trade,16 the “oriental despotism” of the Confucian state,17 the weakness
and cultural history was only a reaction against Western impact.  WILLIAM T. ROWE,
CHINA’S LAST EMPIRE: THE GREAT QING 1–10 (2009). Some argue that the groundwork
for this reaction was laid by developments in Confucian thought going back to the 
sixteenth century. See generally BENJAMIN A. ELMAN, FROM PHILOSOPHY TO PHILOLOGY:
INTELLECTUAL AND SOCIAL ASPECTS OF CHANGE IN LATE IMPERIAL CHINA (1984).
11. On market integration for agricultural produce, textiles, and other personal 
goods in the Chinese economic core, see, e.g., LILLIAN M. LI, FIGHTING FAMINE IN 
NORTH CHINA: STATE, MARKET, AND ENVIRONMENTAL DECLINE 1690S–1990S, at 113, 
164–65, 196–220 (2007); LI BOZHONG, AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN JIANGNAN,
1620–1850, at 107–08 (1998); PHILIP C.C. HUANG, THE PEASANT ECONOMY AND SOCIAL
CHANGE IN NORTH CHINA 118–20 (1985); CHINESE HISTORY IN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE
35–99 (Thomas G. Rawski & Lillian M. Li eds., 1992).  As POMERANZ, supra note 3, at 
86–87, points out, market development in pre-1800 Western Europe does not seem more
advanced. On urbanization in China, a recent literature survey is Yu Tongyuan, Ming
Qing Zaoqi Gongyehua Shehuide Xingcheng yu Fazhan, 11 J. HIST. SCI. (2007): 41,
which argues that 20% of the Jiangnan population around 1700 was urban, while 30% 
was non-agricultural. This is comparable with even the most optimistic estimates on 
English urbanization in 1700, see infra notes 31, 32 and accompanying text. 
12. See, e.g., Lynda S. Bell, Farming, Sericulture, and Peasant Rationality in 
Wuxi County in the Early Twentieth Century, in  CHINESE HISTORY IN ECONOMIC 
PERSPECTIVE, supra note 11, at 207, 226–29, 232–39. 
13. Private property had been the predominant form of land ownership in China 
since the 10th Century. See Joseph P. McDermott, Charting Blank Spaces and Disputed
Regions: The Problem of Sung Land Tenure, 44 J. ASIAN STUD. 13, 13 (1984); 
Madeleine Zelin, A Critique of Rights of Property in Prewar China, in  CONTRACT AND 
PROPERTY IN EARLY MODERN CHINA 17–18 (Madeleine Zelin, Jonathan K. Ocko & 
Robert Gardella eds., 2004). 
14. See Mokyr, supra note 6. 
15. This is the basic thesis of JONES, supra note 1; MARK ELVIN, THE PATTERN OF
THE CHINESE PAST (1973); and ALLEN, supra note 6. 
16. POMERANZ, supra note 3, at 211–97. 
17. The classic statement is attributable to KARL A. WITTFOGEL, ORIENTAL
DESPOTISM: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF TOTAL POWER (1957); see  MAX WEBER, THE 
RELIGION OF CHINA: CONFUCIANISM AND TAOISM (1951) (arguing that China’s Confucian
“religion” prevented the development of capitalism).  For criticism on this, see Peter C.
132
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or negligence of the Qing state,18 and, of course, comparatively “inefficient”
property rights.19  In particular, the recent advent of the “new institutional
economics” has generated growing academic interest in the role of
property rights.  Many have asked whether Chinese property rights were
historically different from English property rights and, if so, whether the 
differences were economically significant.20  This would seem to invite
legal scholars to enter a debate that they have largely ignored—a curious 
omission given their interest in issues of law and development.21  Situating 
itself within the broader debate on Sino-English economic divergence, 
this Article examines the relationship between property rights in land— 
particularly land transaction norms—and agricultural development in
pre-industrial China and England.
Two basic presumptions shape its general approach.  First, it is probably
impossible to draw a simple and direct casual relation between a certain
property norm and the general Sino-English economic divergence.  The 
logical leap seems unacceptably large.  Instead, one must recognize the 
precise social and economic conditions that the norms operate within, 
and address seriously the intermediate outcomes that bridge the gap
between norm and general divergence.  This Article, for example, accepts 
prior arguments that the scarcity of managerial farming in China was 
important to the eventual divergence, and then argues that property rights
can explain this scarcity.  Second, the legal historian has an especially heavy 
burden to simply present legal facts accurately.  In light of previous
Perdue, China in the Early Modern World: Shortcuts, Myths and Realities, EDUCATION
ABOUT ASIA, June 1999. 
18. See, e.g., RAMON H. MYERS, THE CHINESE ECONOMY, PAST AND PRESENT
(1980); R. BIN WONG, CHINA TRANSFORMED: HISTORICAL CHANGE AND THE LIMITS OF
EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE 76, 119 (1997); PETER C. PERDUE, CHINA MARCHES WEST: THE 
QING CONQUEST OF CENTRAL EURASIA 548, 551, 565 (2005). 
19. Scholars originally believed that China simply had no civil law.  See  DERK
BODDE & CLARENCE MORRIS, LAW IN IMPERIAL CHINA 4 (1967); Shiga Shuzo, Qingdai 
Susong Zhidu zhi Minshi Fayuan de Kaocha, in  MING QING SHIQI DE MINSHI SHENPAN 
YU MINJIAN QIYUE 54 (Wang Yaxin & Liang Zhiping eds., Wang Yanxin et al. trans., 
1998) (arguing that civil adjudication had no legal foundation).  This led many European 
historians to incorrectly assume that private property was unique to Europe.  See
McDermott; Zelin supra note 13. 
20. See supra note 19. 
21. See Davis & Trebilcock, supra note 2, at 936, 946.  Legal scholars have 
recently incorporated China into this literature, see discussion at supra note 1, but have 
so far focused almost exclusively on the contemporary Chinese economy.  I have found 
only one law review article published in the past decade that analyzes the “Great
Divergence”: Mokyr, supra note 6, at 49, 61–67. Mokyr is an economist. 
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missteps—claims that rural land was inalienable in the Qing Dynasty,22 
or that protection of private property was exclusive to Northwestern
Europe23— this obvious point bears repeating.
Within the wide-ranging debates on China’s relative decline, one of
the few points of general agreement is that, relative to England, China 
lacked “managerial” or “capitalist” farming—defined as agricultural 
production that relied more on employed labor than household labor.24 
Most scholars would agree that household-level production dominated
Chinese agriculture until the Communist era.  In comparison, by the 
early-eighteenth century, English agriculture—including a large portion
of open-fields agriculture—was predominantly capitalist, whereas it had 
been largely household-based in the sixteenth century.25 
Historians traditionally believed that the higher labor productivity on 
managerial farms created enormous agricultural surpluses that directly 
stimulated English industrial growth.26  Likewise, they often saw China’s
relative lack of agricultural capitalism as a crippling liability that prevented 
robust economic development.27  Although more recent scholarship 
continues to agree that capitalist agriculture substantially boosted
productivity, some—particularly Robert Allen—have questioned whether 
the increase was large enough to explain England’s overall economic
preeminence.28  The debate remains inconclusive.29  It is, however, a
 22. See discussion infra pp. 147–48. 
23. E.g., NORTH & THOMAS, supra note 3, at 1–8. 
24. There is a detailed discussion of this infra Part I. See generally ELVIN, supra
note 15; LI WENZHI ET AL., MING QING SHIDAI DE NONGYE ZIBEN ZHUYI MENGYA WENTI
(1983); PHILIP C.C. HUANG, THE PEASANT FAMILY AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE
YANGTZE DELTA, 1350–1988, at 58–76 (1990); HUANG, supra note 11, at 85–87;
SUCHETA MAZUMDAR, SUGAR AND SOCIETY IN CHINA: PEASANTS, TECHNOLOGY & THE
WORLD MARKET 192–250 (1998); LI, supra note 11, at 85–87. 
25. See Leigh Shaw-Taylor, The Rise of Agrarian Capitalism and the Decline of 
Family Farming in England,  THE ECONOMIC HISTORY REVIEW, 4, 17–18, Mar. 1, 2011, 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-0289.2010.00585.x/pdf; ROBERT C.
ALLEN, ENCLOSURE AND THE YEOMAN: THE AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOUTH
MIDLANDS 1450–1850, at 73, tbl.4-4, 78–104 (1992); Stephen Hipkin, The structure of 
landownership and land occupation in the Romney Marsh region, 1646–1834, 51 AGRIC.
HIST. R. 69, 69 (2003); Daniel Grigg, Farm size in England and Wales, from early 
Victorian times to the present, 35 AGRIC. HIST. R. 179, 188–89 (1987).  See generally
R.H. TAWNEY, THE AGRARIAN PROBLEM IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY (1912); THE 
BRENNER DEBATE, supra note 4. 
26. ALLEN, supra note 25, at 2–5 (summarizing the field prior to 1992).  Even
Allen, who is critical of this tradition, acknowledges that capitalist farms were somewhat
more productive. Id., at 18–19. 
27. See supra note 24 (consider China’s lack of managerial farming an important 
economic liability.)
28. Peter C. Perdue, China and the World Economy: Exports, Regions, and 
Theories, 60 HARV. J. ASIATIC STUD. 259, 272–75 (2000); ALLEN, supra note 25, at 17– 
19, 218–27. 
134
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fundamentally economic debate that reaches far beyond the scope of
legal history, and this Article cannot offer a resolution.  One might note, 
of course, that the transition to capitalist farming was important for reasons
other than simply increasing agricultural productivity.  Most notably, it 
aided industrial development by freeing up labor and concentrating 
capital. This latter effect was particularly valuable in economies that did
not recognize limited liability corporations, a characterization that applies to
both Qing China and pre-nineteenth century England.30  For our present 
purposes, it suffices to state that one cannot argue intelligibly about the 
broader Sino-English economic divergence without addressing the contrast
in the scale of agriculture, and that this contrast therefore deserves a 
thorough examination of its causes. 
Here, legal history takes a far more central role. England was not
always a land of managerial farms, nor was the transition easy.  English 
agriculture was, as noted above, predominately household-based even in 
the sixteenth century, while the size of her agricultural population actually
increased by at least 30%—quite possibly by as much as 75%—between
29. Allen has been criticized, based on his own data, for heavily understating the 
importance of capitalist farming to pre-1700 English agriculture.  Shaw-Taylor, supra
note 25, at 6–7.  His admission that capitalist farms were ultimately more efficient than
household farms has allowed some to use his own observations against him.  See
Brenner & Isett, supra note 6, at 626. 
30. E.g., ELLEN MEIKSINS WOOD, THE ORIGIN OF CAPITALISM 57–59 (1999). The 
idea that “primitive accumulation” of capital, particularly land, was crucial to the
initiation of capitalist growth and has been central to Western economic thought since 
Adam Smith and Karl Marx.  ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES
OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 111 (Joseph Shield Nicholson ed., 1884); KARL MARX, 1 
CAPITAL ch. 31, available at http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/ch31. 
htm (1867, last accessed Dec. 7, 2010).  These ideas continue to be influential in modern 
political economics.  See, e.g., MICHAEL PERELMAN, THE INVENTION OF CAPITALISM:
CLASSICAL POLITICAL ECONOMY AND THE SECRET HISTORY OF PRIMITIVE ACCUMULATION 
2–5 (2000) (acknowledging primitive accumulation’s role in the creation of capitalism 
but arguing that it displaced peasants); DAVID HARVEY, THE NEW IMPERIALISM, 145–46, 
149 (2003) (discussing accumulation by dispossession).  Recent histories of Chinese 
business have argued that the lack of capital concentration among late-Qing
entrepreneurs forced most companies to become joint-ventures, which was difficult and 
costly without the possibility of limited liability.  MADELEINE ZELIN, THE MERCHANTS OF
ZIGONG: INDUSTRIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN EARLY MODERN CHINA 223–68 (2005); 
William C. Kirby, China, Unincorporated: Company Law and Business Enterprise in 
Twentieth Century China, 54 J. ASIAN STUD. 43 (1995). England also did not allow free 
limited liability incorporation until the nineteenth century. Ron Harris, The Private 
Origins of the Private Company: Britain 1862–1907, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1613206 (2009).  But the concentration of wealth represented
and facilitated by managerial farming conceivably allowed English proto-industrialists to 
bypass this institutional difficulty.
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1500 and 1700.31  Even in 1700, 60–80% of England’s population
was agricultural.32  Meanwhile, her vaunted textile industry remained very
modest in size until the later eighteenth century, as did her overseas trade.33 
The creation of managerial farms during the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries was, therefore, the fundamental reorganization of a predominantly 
agricultural society, and not the transition between an agricultural society
and a manufacturing-based one.  Rather than driving people from farming 
into industrial shops, this process more often involved the contentious
process of purchasing land from smallholders, creating large farms, and
then reemploying the land-deprived poor as wageworkers. Qing China’s 
active markets for land, technological development, and significant
urbanization34 saved Qing and Republican smallholders from a similar 
fate? 
Unsurprisingly, over two decades of academic discussion has not
produced any consensus.  Some argued that labor was simply too expensive
for managerial farming in China.35 Others emphasized various institutional 
or legal factors related to one’s ability to amass large, consolidated farms:
Chinese family division customs, the weaker power of eviction Chinese
landlords had against tenants, and lineage rights of first refusal (which 
purportedly limited a Chinese landowner’s ability to sell his land.).36 
31. The 30% figure is obtained by combining data from Robert C. Allen,
Economic Structure and Agricultural Productivity in Europe, 1300-1800, 3 EUR. R.
ECON. HIST. 1, 11 (2000), and Theofanis C. Tsoulouhas, A New Look at Demographic 
and Technological Changes: England, 1550 to 1839, 29 EXPLORATIONS IN ECON. HIST. 
169, 176–77 (1992) (using data from Wrigley and Lindert).  The former estimates the
percentage of the population in agriculture, while the latter estimates the total population.
Tsoulouhas’ figures starts from 1550, but the 1500 population is either very similar or 
slightly lower.  Allen’s estimate on the percentage of total population in agriculture for
1700, roughly 60%, is much lower than other estimates, which go up to 80%, see infra
note 32.  If we use this latter figure, then the 30% estimate would become 75%. 
32. For an analysis of the 80% figure, see S. Todd Lowry, The Agricultural
Foundation of the Seventeenth-Century English Oeconomy, 35 HIST. POL. ECON. 74, 75
(2003). Lowry notes that 94% of the population was agricultural in 1520, whereas over 
70% remained so in 1800.  Assuming a linear decrease, the percentage in 1700 would be 
around 80%. This is an underestimate, as the speed of urbanization accelerated in the 
later 1700s. For an analysis of the 60% figure, see Allen, supra note 31. 
33. For the relative unimportance of trade to the early modern English economy
and the “modest” size of her manufacturing sector, see RALPH DAVIS, THE INDUSTRIAL
REVOLUTION AND BRITISH OVERSEAS TRADE 63 (1979).  Davis’ evaluation is reconfirmed 
in Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James Robinson, The Rise of Europe: Atlantic 
Trade, Institutional Change, and Economic Growth, 95 AM. ECON. R. 546 (2005), 
although Acemoglu et al. argue that trade was institutionally important even if
statistically modest.
34. For markets and private property, see notes 11–13.  For the underestimated
pace of Chinese technological development, see LI, supra note 11; and MAZUMDAR, 
supra note 24, at 120–91. 
35. See infra Part II. 
36. Id. 
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Anglo-American property law scholars will find this latter explanation 
particularly intuitive.  American legal historians have often argued that 
“the Anglo-American system of private property emerged from a restrictive 
feudal regime in which . . . alienation of land was prohibited.”37  As Henry
Maine stated, “the movement of the progressive societies has . . . been a
movement from Status to Contract.”38  Modern scholars continue to
believe that “[m]odernity . . . fosters alienability. . . .  As groups modernize,
they . . . relax traditional restrictions on transfer.”39  Arguing that Chinese
agricultural inefficiencies stem from the inalienability of land certainly
constitutes a straightforward application of these ideas, but also one that 
suffers from serious empirical defects.  Existing evidence suggests that 
lineage rights of first refusal did very little to obstruct the efficient
transaction of land in China’s core socioeconomic regions.40  Similarly,  
the evidence fails to show that either family division customs or the lack 
of eviction rights significantly impeded the spread of managerial farming.41 
Other explanations have their own difficulties.  Data from rural labor 
markets indicate that most Chinese peasants who possessed surplus land 
found it more productive and profitable to employ wage-labor than to 
rent out the surplus.  The existence of economic incentives that favored 
managerial farming suggests, therefore, that its relative scarcity compared to
English agriculture might be attributed to institutional differences.
Previous scholarship has not, however, persuasively identified any such 
difference.
This Article attempts to fill the gap. It argues that the primary “problem”
with Chinese property rights was not that they restricted the transaction 
of land, but rather that they frequently gave the original owner of transacted 
property an extremely strong right of redemption.  The great majority of
 37. Claire Priest, Creating an American Property Law: Alienability and Its Limits 
in American History, 120 HARV. L. REV. 385, 392 (2006). 
38. HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 170 (Transaction Publishers 2002) (3d
ed. 1866). 
39. Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1376–77 (1993).
See also JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 197–220 (5th ed. 2002).  The 
law and development literature provides clear empirical evidence that modern economic 
development requires alienable property rights.  Kevin Davis & Michael J. Trebilcock,
What Role Do Legal Institutions Play in Development? 4, available at http://www.imf.
org/external/pubs/ft/seminar/1999/reforms/trebil.pdf (1999) (“The current economic
consensus would probably accord priority, in terms of the role of law in development, to 
well-defined and alienable private property rights . . . .”).
40. See infra Part II. 
41. Id.
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Chinese land transactions were neither permanent sales nor mortgages in
the modern sense, but “conditional sales” (dian) that transferred possessory 
rights to the “buyer” while, under most local customs, guaranteeing the 
“seller” a right of redemption at zero-interest that was virtually absolute 
and interminable.  The central government did prohibit conditional sales 
redemption after a certain number of years, but had little success enforcing 
these regulations. Land transactions could therefore avoid finalization
for decades.  In comparison, English law and custom contained strong 
limits on the redemption of “conditional” conveyances—mainly mortgages 
—that forced permanent alienation if the seller failed to redeem within a 
short time frame, customarily only a year.  Enforcement of redemption
deadlines was extraordinarily harsh until the late seventeenth century,
making permanent alienation a frequent and dependable outcome even
for conditional conveyances, and thereby conveniencing the accumulation 
of large farms. 
In Qing and Republican China, however, the unlimited right of
redemption in dian sales meant that peasants had little incentive to 
permanently alienate their land.  If they needed a lump sum to cover
immediate needs, a conditional sale was usually satisfactory, while also 
preserving the option of zero-interest redemption.  If, however, they
simply wished to maximize the sale price of their land, the practice of
zhaotie in conditional sales, as discussed below, allowed them to take 
advantage of future increases in land value—usually a reasonable
assumption.42  Permanent alienation was therefore unattractive, and rarely 
used. Farmers who acquired land under a dian sale therefore found it
difficult to obtain secure and permanent ownership.  For many, the lack 
of security would have been enough deterrence against managerial farming, 
as it cautioned against making capital investments to further boost 
productivity.  As for those enterprising peasants who nonetheless chose 
to create managerial farms through conditional purchases, their farms 
would face disintegration whenever an original owner decided to redeem,
always a real and disruptive possibility.  Over the long run, these factors 
impeded the concentration of farmland. 
This explanation is heavily understudied in the existing literature.  A 
few scholars have made passing mention of the potential relationship 
between conditional sales and land accumulation,43 but no serious analysis
currently exists, especially one conducted from a rigorously comparative 
perspective.  This is unfortunate, for the thesis proposed here neatly avoids 
the empirical difficulties that haunt other theories.  This Article seeks to
demonstrate its plausibility through surveying a fairly diverse collection 
42. See infra pp. 151–52. 
43. See discussion infra Part III. 
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of legal and economic data, drawn from both primary and secondary
sources.
Existing studies on the Qing and Republican regulation of conditional
sales disagree over a number of key issues, including the precise content 
of central regulations and the extent to which they were enforced.44 
Much of this Article focuses, therefore, on carefully presenting the 
institutional comparison between Chinese conditional sales and English
mortgages, drawing particular attention to the complex relation between
customs and formal law.  It then links this contrast in property rights
to the divergence in agricultural capitalism.  This involves unpacking the 
institutional economic theory outlined above in greater detail, but, more 
importantly, testing it against data on transaction volume, land-ownership 
patterns, and labor-to-land ratios. Existing evidence seems to confirm 
our theoretical hypotheses admirably well. 
The creation of efficient property rights depended, therefore, on more 
than just making property rights “alienable,” that is, capable of being 
transacted if the owner so desired.45  Whereas the problem with medieval 
European property rights often was that they were simply inalienable,46 
Qing and Republican property rights posed subtler difficulties: Although
they were generally alienable, the specific mechanisms of transaction
created questionable incentives for both sellers and buyers.  Thus, any
property rights-based perspective on economic development must consider
not only whether property rights were alienable, but also how. 
44. See infra pp. 150–52. 
45. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85 
COLUM. L. REV. 931, 931–32 (1985) (defining inalienability as “any restriction on the 
transferability, ownership, or use of an entitlement,” and noting that other scholars focus 
only on situations where “sales are not permitted”).  Even Rose-Ackerman’s broader 
definition cannot incorporate the issues we discuss here.  The only substantive restriction 
of ownership, use or transferability we found was that the conditional buyer’s ownership 
could be terminated by redemption, similar to how a mortgagee or tenant’s rights are not 
absolute.  Few would consider this a limitation upon alienability. 
46. Entails limited the alienability of land in medieval England, although the 
prevalence of “common recoveries” severely diminished their practical effects by 1500.
See Percy Bordwell, Alienability and Perpetuities III, 24 IOWA L. REV. 1, 51–56 (1938); 
A. JAMES CASNER & BARTON LEACH, CASES AND TEXT ON PROPERTY 256 (1969). After
the demise of feudal incidents in the late seventeenth century, the entail was effectively 
revived in the form of the strict settlement.  See Charles J. Reid, The Seventeenth 
Century Revolution in the English Land Law, 43 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 221, 261–80 (1995).
Entails were widespread and powerful in France and Spain until the nineteenth century.
Raymond Carr, Spain, in THE EUROPEAN NOBILITY IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 43, 51 
(Albert Goodwin ed., 1967); ROBERT FORSTER, THE NOBILITY OF TOULOUSE IN THE
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY: A SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STUDY 120, 162–63 (1960). 
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Our findings here also relate to important debates within law and 
economics that address the economic efficiency of social norms.47  While  
scholars have provided ample evidence that communities often create 
their own social norms and, moreover, that these norms frequently outrank 
formal laws in practical importance,48 they have vigorously debated whether
“norms are likely to promote social welfare,”49 with “welfare” regularly 
defined as economic efficiency.  Some express optimism, at least for 
“closely-knit” communities that share information;50  others disagree.51 
This Article offers a direct test-case: The Chinese land customs examined 
here were probably the creation of close-knit rural communities, but also
lowered macroeconomic efficiency by impeding the development of
managerial farming.  In fact, agricultural productivity would arguably have 
risen had central regulations limiting land redemption been effectively 
enforced.  While it would be folly to “refute” the optimists based on one 
historical example, however significant, it does present a challenge that
deserves consideration. 
One lingering question is how and why Chinese rural communities 
created these comparatively inefficient property customs in the first place. 
Development economists might see the limiting effect that Chinese dian
norms had on land concentration as a case study of the surplus labor 
model—the influential theory that agricultural communities often create
income-sharing mechanisms that allow agricultural workers to earn more
than their marginal product.52  As discussed below, it is indeed possible
that, consistent with the model’s predictions, poorer rural households 
negotiated dian norms to protect against economic expansion by richer 
households.53 
Geographically, this Article focuses on the Lower Yangtze and North 
China. It makes little sense to compare England with all of China due to
the enormous size difference.  Instead, we focus only on the more
developed areas: the Lower Yangtze was the richest region in the
47. Robert C. Ellickson, Law and Economics Discovers Social Norms, 27 J. LEGAL
STUD. 537, 542 (1998). 
48. A concise review of the relevant literature can be found in Ellickson, supra
note 47; and Amitai Etzioni, Social Norms: Internalization, Persuasion and History, 34 
L. & SOC. REV. 157, 157 (2000). The path-breaking book in this field is, of course, 
ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOWNEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 128–30 
(1991).
49. Richard H. McAdams, Comment: Accounting for Norms, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 
625, 635 (1997). 
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See Gustav Ranis, The Microeconomics of “Surplus Labor” (Yale Econ.
Growth Ctr., Discussion Paper 772, 1997), available at http://www.econ.yale.edu/growth 
_pdf/cdp772.pdf. 
53. See infra pp. 180–81. 
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country, while North China was the relative “hotbed” of Chinese
managerial farming.54  Temporally, the Article covers 1500-1700 for
England, mainly because managerial farming had achieved predominance
by the latter date.  The appropriate time frame for China is considerably 
longer and somewhat later, as farming remained household-based 
throughout the Qing and Republic.  This article asks not only why 
English agriculture made the transition by 1700, but also why Chinese 
agriculture did not “catch up” for over two centuries, even though it had 
every economic incentive, at both micro and macro levels, to do so.  One 
could say the same of the general Sino-English economic divergence: it 
is intriguing not simply because China did not industrialize before Western 
Europe, but also because it failed to do so long after the disparity had 
become painfully obvious.
Part Two surveys the extent of managerial farming in England and
China. Part Three argues that existing explanations for this contrast are 
generally unsatisfactory and provides some economic background.  In 
particular, the evidence suggests that it made economic sense, even in
China, for relatively wealthy peasants to pursue managerial farming.
Their general inability to do so suggests the existence of institutional 
obstacles.
Parts Four, Five, and Six present the case for a conditional sales-based
explanation.  Part Four examines Qing and Republican norms on
conditional sales, highlighting the clash between law and local custom,
in which the latter emerged victorious.  Part Five then compares these 
customs with English law and custom on various land transaction
mechanisms, arguing that English norms of land redemption were
drastically harsher.  Part Six discusses the economic consequences of
this property rights comparison, conducting various empirical tests
for our proposed explanation.  A short conclusion identifies avenues for 
further research. 
II. CAPITALIST AGRICULTURE IN EARLY MODERN
CHINA AND ENGLAND
The attractiveness of “managerial farming” as an academic concept 
derives from its statistical flexibility and clarity.  A “capitalist” or “managerial” 
farm—for the sake of consistency, this Article will generally use the 
54. HUANG, supra note 11, at 69–84;WENZHI ET AL., supra note 24, at 215–17. 
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latter term—is simply one that employs wage labor for most of its 
everyday operations.55  This avoids artificial numerical “lower bounds,” 
which would inevitably fail to account for at least some individual
circumstances.  Equally important, it avoids the somewhat tedious debate 
over Chinese landownership patterns, instead focusing directly on the
actual scale of farming.  After all, in terms of agricultural productivity, a 
100 mu plot that is rented out to ten tenants is hardly any different from 
ten plots of 10 mu, separately owned.  Finally, we might note that
managerial farms also exist in open-fields agriculture56—in fact, around
1700, more than half of open-fields agriculture in Southern England was 
capitalist.57  It is not logically tied to “enclosure,” nor as ideologically 
charged. 
The idea that agricultural capitalism sparked the English economic 
takeoff is exceedingly old and resilient.58  After much debate, scholars
have reached at least some consensus on the basic chronology.  By 1700, 
small-scale managerial farming predominated throughout the South, 
especially in the vicinity of London.59  Although household production
still predominated in parts of the poorer Northwest, the transition was 
nonetheless well underway, with nearly half of the farming population 
employed as full-time wage-laborers.60  Whereas most scholars—some 
rather reluctantly—would agree that this transition boosted agricultural 
productivity,61 the classic theory that such increases set off English
economic divergence from continental Europe is questionable.62  Recent 
studies show, for example, that the richer regions of France also
experienced a strong shift towards small-scale managerial farming
between 1550 and 1750.63 
Despite deep and sweeping changes in Qing economic historiography
over the past decades, the notion that Qing agriculture relied predominantly 
on household-level smallholdings remains unchallenged.64  Scholars have
 55. ALLEN, supra note 25, at 56–57. 
56. Even in open-fields agriculture, land was privately owned for most of the year. 
See Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1390 (1993). 
57. ALLEN, supra note 25, at 73, tbl.4-4. 
58. Id. at 2–5. 
59. See sources cited supra note 25. 
60. Shaw-Taylor, supra note 25. 
61. See discussion supra notes 25–28. A literature review is also available at 
PHILIP T. HOFFMAN, GROWTH IN A TRADITIONAL SOCIETY: THE FRENCH COUNTRYSIDE, 
1450–1815, at 143–45 (1996).  For Hoffman’s own theories, see id. at 146–49, 162–64 
(acknowledging that managerial farming boosted productivity). 
62. HOFFMAN, supra note 61, at 143–49, 162–64. 
63. Id.
64. See, e.g., McDermott, supra note 13, at 33 (noting that large manors, worked 
by bound labor, was giving way to smallholders and tenants even around 1100); 
POMERANZ, supra note 3, at 81 (more conservatively placing the transition at around
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periodically debated the extent of landownership concentration, but this 
only discusses whether large landlords owned a higher percentage of total 
land than previously assumed, not whether they farmed a higher percentage.
Higher concentration of ownership could simply have reflected a higher
level of tenancy.  Joseph Esherick, for example, argues that “landlords”
and “rich peasants” owned around 56% of arable land in early twentieth
century China, but nonetheless concedes that around 42% of this was 
rented out in small parcels.65 
Given the significant regional variation in Chinese agriculture,
national-level statistics are of limited use.  A better approach would be
to study individual agricultural regions, where ecological conditions and
farming techniques were more uniform.  For conceptual clarity, we will
employ William Skinner’s physiographic subdivisions66 and, as mentioned 
above, focus on “North China” and the “Lower Yangtze.”  In John Buck’s
1937 statistical report, these are roughly equivalent to the “winter wheat-
kaoliang area” and the “Yangtze rice-wheat area.”67 
Philip Huang’s 1985 manuscript remains the most comprehensive
agrarian study of North China.  Huang estimates that hired labor accounted 
for around 17% of total labor input, with about half of that coming from 
managerial farms.68  Including the owner’s own household labor,69 
managerial farms incorporated perhaps 9.5% of labor input.  Since labor 
input-per-mu on “large” Northern farms was, according to Buck’s surveys,
around 90% of the median,70 managerial farms probably occupied at
least 11% of total farmland.  A crude calculation based on Esherick’s
data71 suggests a slightly higher figure.  “Landlords” cultivated—as
1600). Both estimates support our claim, although McDermott’s data is more up-to-date 
than the controversial source Pomeranz relies on. ELVIN, supra note 15. 
65. Joseph W. Esherick, Number Games: A Note on Land Distribution in 
Prerevolutionary China, 7MODERN CHINA 387, 397, 405 (1981). 
66. STANFORD UNIV. PRESS, THE CITY IN LATE IMPERIAL CHINA 3–31 (G. William
Skinner ed., 1977). 
67. JOHN L. BUCK, LAND UTILIZATION IN CHINA: A STUDY OF 16,786 FARMS IN 168
LOCALITIES, AND 38,256 FARM FAMILIES IN TWENTY-TWO PROVINCES IN CHINA, 1929– 
1933, at 27 (1937). 
68. HUANG (1985), supra note 11, at 80–81. Other scholars, such as MAZUMDAR, 
supra note 24, at 237, frequently cite to his data. 
69. Calculated from Mantetsu survey data reproduced in HUANG (1985), supra
note 11, at 170. 
70. JOHN L. BUCK, THE CHINESE FARM ECONOMY 47, 53 (1930). 
71. Esherick, supra note 65, at 397, 402–05.  These figures are derived by
subtracting the “land rented-out” from the total amount of land owned. Assume, for 
example, that Class A of landowners owned x percent of total land under tenancy, which 
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opposed to rented out—around 10% of total farmland, while “rich
peasants” cultivated another 18–20%.  Assuming that nearly all
landlords and some of the wealthiest “rich peasants” ran managerial
farms, the total would probably be around 15% of total farmland. 
Existing studies on the Lower Yangtze share fewer consensuses.  The 
common opinion seems to be that managerial farming was virtually non-
existent here: Wage labor accounted for less than 5% of total labor-input
and, in any case, was concentrated on rich peasant holdings that were too
small to be considered managerial.72  These arguments utilize two sources: 
Buck’s data and a 1949 study by the East China Military Administration
Committee.  This latter source indicates that roughly 4% of rural
households in the early twentieth century were “agricultural laborers,” but
this figure only includes landless households.73  Wage laborers that owned 
any land were excluded.  Moreover, the interpretation of Buck’s data is
surprising—by his calculation, hired labor accounted for 12-14% of the 
Lower Yangtze’s total labor-input.74 
This latter figure may be more plausible, even if Buck’s survey
overemphasizes the importance of large farms.75  By most estimates, the
average nineteenth century Lower Yangtze household could only
cultivate around 8 mu of grain—double-cropped—and 2 mu of mulberries
without the aid of hired labor.76  A detailed 1929 survey of three Wuxi
villages77 seems to support this assertion: nearly all farms that exceeded 
10 mu employed substantial amounts of wage labor, generally for no less 
than 100 labor days per year.  Of the three farms that exceeded 20 mu, 
wage labor accounted for more than 60% of total labor input on two, and 
for nearly 50% on the third.  This suggests that most farms larger than 20
mu were managerial.  According to a 1920s study, such farms occupied 
around 3 percent of total farmland in surveyed counties, while farms that 
exceeded 15 mu accounted for another 32%.78  All in all, while the
scale of managerial farming was considerably smaller in the Lower 
accounted for y percent of total land, and that Class A owned z percent of all arable land,
then the amount of land that Class A managed on its own would be z-x*y.
72. See, e.g., HUANG (1990), supra note 24, at 58–60; MAZUMDAR, supra note 24,
at 237. 
73. HUADONG JUNZHENG WEIYUANHUI, JIANGSU SHENG NONGCUN DIAOCHA 13,
29–30, 62–64 (1952). 
74. BUCK, supra note 67, at 293. 
75. This bias is well-known, but a quantitative adjustment seems impossible.  See
Esherick, supra note 65; Randy Stross, Numbers Games Rejected, 10 REPUBLICAN CHINA
No. 3, at 1 (1985). 
76. LI BOZHONG, AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN JIANGNAN, 1620–1850, at 136– 
38, 140 (1998). 
77. Bell, supra note 12, at 207, 226–29, 232–39. 
78. See Li Bozhong, Rengeng Shimu yu Mingqing Jiangnan Nongmin de Jingying
Guimo, 1996 ZHONGGUO NONGSHI No.1, at 1, 6.
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Yangtze than in North China, it did exist.  Wage labor was probably much
more prevalent than Huang suggests as well. 
Still, when compared to eighteenth century English farming, even the 
North China figures seem miniscule.  Nor was agriculture in other Chinese
macroregions noticeably more concentrated.  Nowhere did wage labor 
account for even 25% of total labor input.79  Interestingly, the level of
land concentration in China could experience mild but prolonged declines
during times of relative peace, as it did between 1703 and 1771, and
between 1870 and 1930.80  There was ultimately a real and drastic difference
between China and post-1700 England in the scale of agricultural 
production.  But why?
III. EXISTING EXPLANATIONS AND BACKGROUND INFORMATION
Existing explanations fall into two categories: economic and 
institutional. The former argues that managerial farming simply made no 
economic sense in China, either because it generated no increase in
productivity, involved too much risk, or, somewhat more plausibly, was 
relatively unprofitable for most individual households.81  The economic
demand for managerial farming was therefore low.  In comparison,
institutional explanations argue that legal or customary obstacles would
have prevented the creation of managerial farms even had demand been 
high. Scholars have recently explored two different possibilities.  Some 
argue that certain Chinese customs restricted the free alienation of land
—that is, landowners found it difficult to convey land even if they wanted
to.82  Others claim that the problem was with rights of exclusion.  Large
Chinese landlords were unable to expel their tenants and, therefore, could 
not consolidate their holdings into managerial farms.83  Some also point 
to differences between Chinese and English inheritance norms, arguing 
79. BUCK, supra note 67, at 293. 
80. For 1703 to 1771, see LI WENZHI, MINGQING SHIDAI FENGJIAN TUDI GUANXI DE
SONGJIE 58 (2007).  For 1870 to 1930, see Ramon Myers, Land Distribution in 
Revolutionary China, 8 THE CHUNG CHI J. 62 (1969).
81. LI WENZHI ET AL., supra note 24, at 215–17; HUANG (1990), supra note 24, at 
58-76; CHINESE CAPITALISM 1522–1840, at 158–61 (Xu Dixin & Wu Chengming eds., Li 
Zhengde et al. trans., 2000). 
82. See, e.g., HUANG (1990), supra note 24, at 107–08; MAZUMDAR, supra note 24, 
at 217–30.  See also the discussion at POMERANZ, supra note 3, at 70–72. 
83. The clearest argument to this is effect is made by Brenner & Isett, supra note 
6. 
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that English primogeniture promoted economies of scale by keeping 
household property in one piece.84 
Although recent developments in European economic history have
questioned whether farms consistently become more productive as they 
increase in size, the key comparison in that particular debate has been 
between smaller managerial farms and larger ones.85 The classical argument 
that small-scale managerial production is, at least, more productive than
household production remains largely unchallenged.86  Existing data on
North China and the Lower Yangtze do seem to agree with this orthodoxy.
Buck’s surveys show that farms of all sizes generated nearly identical
per-crop acre yields in the early twentieth century, but yield rather chaotic 
results on labor productivity.  The general survey apparently shows that 
“large farms” used less than 50% of the labor input-per-cultivated acre 
that “small farms” needed, but a separate data sample suggests they used 
around 87%.87  Nonetheless, the general impression is that households 
with surplus land could boost productivity by hiring outside labor, although 
the size of that boost could vary tremendously.  When we factor in the 
more efficient use of farm animals and tools on large farms,88 the
productivity edge is even more pronounced. 
Theoretically, managerial farms enjoy several important efficiency
advantages over household-based ones. First, they usually manage labor 
input more effectively, most intuitively because their larger size enables 
greater labor specialization,89 but also because they can swiftly adapt to 
changes in the size of land holding or production conditions by laying-
off or hiring workers as circumstances demand.90  Moreover, their larger
size facilitates coordinated investments in the land that can improve its 
84. See infra note 140. 
85. See, e.g., Charles Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin, Historical Alternatives to Mass 
Production: Politics, Markets and Technology in Nineteenth-Century Industrialization, 
108 PAST & PRESENT 133 (1985). For a survey of more theoretical writings, see 
Matthew Gorton & Sophia Davidova, Farm productivity and efficiency in the CEE 
applicant countries: a synthesis of results, 30 AGRICULTURAL ECON. 1 (2004). 
86. See discussion supra notes 25, 29. 
87. BUCK, supra note 67, at 273, 276; BUCK, supra note 70.  Professor Pomeranz 
raised some concerns at a 2011 American Historical Association panel discussion, 
“Property Rights and Economic Development in the Qing” (Jan. 9, 2011), about whether 
managerial farming really boosted labor productivity in the Lower Yangtze.  I have yet 
to see, however, any substantive evidence to the contrary.  The most conservative
figures, drawn from BUCK, supra note 70, and reaffirmed by Pomeranz himself in Land 
Markets in Late Imperial and Republican China, 23 CONTINUITY & CHANGE 101, 118–19
(2008), still suggest that large, predominantly managerial farms enjoyed a 13 percent 
labor productivity edge even in the Yangtze Delta.
88. BUCK, supra note 67, at 277; see also, HUANG (1985), supra note 11, at 144– 
45. 
89. HUANG, supra note 11, at 70. 
90. Id.
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overall productivity, for example through optimizing irrigation, roads, or 
use of animals and fertilizer.91  In short, managerial farming promotes 
economies of scale.92  The main factors that potentially make managerial 
farming less productive than household production are management and
supervision costs. By employing labor, one naturally increases the need 
for planning and oversight.  In some cases these costs may be so high
that they negatively affect productivity, but as we discuss later, such 
scenarios were unlikely in Qing and Republican China.93 
A more complicated and ultimately more important issue is whether 
managerial farming was profitable enough to attract individual landowners,
even if they were more productive. Profit is, after all, a better predictor 
of individual economic behavior than productivity.  Several scholars 
have argued that the cost of hired labor was so high in the Yangtze Delta 
that landowners made larger profits by leasing out their land than by 
consolidating it into managerial farms.94  The primary evidence for this
claim seems to be a set of late-nineteenth century missionary surveys
collected by Li Wenzhi, which suggest that leasing out was 35%
more profitable than managerial farming in Southern Jiangsu, and nearly
three times as profitable in Zhejiang.95 As Li himself admits, however,
his data relied heavily on a few scattered case studies and “are generally
of limited trustworthiness.”96  In fact, recent estimates of Lower Yangtze 
wages from 1750 to the early twentieth century would lower Li’s wage
figures by 30 to 55%, or by 6 to 16 taels of silver.97  Using these more
conventional estimates, managerial farming was more profitable than 
91. See discussion infra p. 175. 
92. While it is also possible for several smaller farms to make these investment 
decisions cooperatively, consolidating the smaller patches under more unified ownership
helps internalize and lower the transaction and organization costs involved.  Ronald H. 
Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). 
93. See discussion infra pp. 145–47. 
94. LI WENZHI ET AL., supra note 24, at 215–17; HUANG, supra note 24, at 58–76. 
95. LI WENZHI ET AL., supra note 24, at 215–17. 
96. Id. at 216; see also  HUANG, supra note 24, at 58–76 (but these pamphlets
largely come from the early Qing, when labor was considerably scarcer).
97. The 1750 estimates come from POMERANZ, supra note 3, at 319–20 (estimating
an upper-limit wage of around 12 taels).  Robert Allen et al. argue, in Wages, Prices, and
Living Standards in China, 1738–1925: In comparison with Europe, Japan, and India
51, (Oxford Univ. Dep’t of Econ., Working Paper No. 316 (2007), that the nominal 
agricultural wage basically remained stable (or declined slightly) from 1750 to the 
nineteenth century and largely confirm Pomeranz’s estimates.  Li’s wage estimates,
supra note 24, at 216, when converted to silver taels, suggest an annual agricultural wage 
of around 28 taels for Southern Jiangsu and around 18 taels for Zhejiang. 
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leasing by at least 60% in Southern Jiangsu, and equally profitable in 
Zhejiang. 
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that Li’s figures are representative, 
they would imply that very few Lower Yangtze households had incentive to
employ any wage labor. In particular, while Li’s estimates focus on the
cost of year-laborers, a quick calculation based on his sources indicates
that day-laborers were comparably unprofitable. Using Li’s data, leasing
out would still have been 27 to 33% more profitable than employing day-
laborers in Southern Jiangsu, and more than 2.5 times as profitable in 
Northern Zhejiang.98  The problem is that wage labor was, in fact, important
to the Lower Yangtze economy.  As argued above, households employing 
some wage labor conceivably occupied 50% of total farmland99—wage
labor accounted for perhaps 15% of total agricultural labor input.100 
For Li’s data to make sense, we must assume that most of these
households were financially irrational. Given that most Lower Yangtze 
households farmed significantly less than 10 mu,101 households wishing
to rent out excess land would have encountered a healthy supply of 
potential tenants.  The assumption of widespread economic irrationality is,
however, without merit.102  Apparently, the employment of wage labor was
profitable enough to attract a very significant portion of rural households,
which makes good sense under the more recent wage data discussed above. 
In any case, arguments that labor was too expensive are strictly limited to
the Lower Yangtze.  As their proponents acknowledge, quite the opposite 
was true of North China, where managerial farming was considerably
98. This calculation uses data presented at Bell, supra note 12, and JOHN L. BUCK,
LAND UTILIZATION IN CHINA: STATISTICS 328 (1937), and assumes that the average year-
laborer worked around 200 days, HUANG (1985), supra note 11, at 81. 
99. See discussion supra p. 141 (Farms exceeding 15 mu occupied 35% of total 
farmland, while nearly all farms exceeding 10 mu employed some wage labor.  While we
do not have precise numbers for households owning between 10 and 15 mu, it seems 
reasonable to assume that they occupied at least 15% of total farmland—given that farms 
between 15 and 20 mu occupied nearly a third of total farmland—and, therefore, 
reasonable to suggest that farms employing some wage labor occupied around 50% of 
total farmland). 
100. See discussion surrounding supra note 74. 
101. By the mid-nineteenth century, the average Lower Yangtze household farmed
around 7 mu, split 7:3 between rice and mulberries.  Various existing estimates and
figures are compiled at Brenner & Isett, supra note 6, at 620. 
102. See Bell, supra note 12. After the Song Dynasty, while certain elite families 
were still politically ambitious enough to focus instead on national examinations and 
political ties, even most gentry households depended on landholding and economic 
affluence for their social status. See HILARY BEATTIE, LAND AND LINEAGE IN CHINA: A
STUDY OF T’UNG-CH’ENG COUNTY, ANHWEI, IN THE MING AND CH’ING DYNASTIES
(1979); BEVERLY BOSSLER, POWERFUL RELATIONS: KINSHIP, STATUS, AND STATE IN SUNG 
CHINA (1996). Anyone who wishes to argue that rural Chinese households eschewed 
profit-maximizing behavior must, therefore, bear the burden of the proof. 
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more profitable than leasing out.103  This certainly makes the predominance
of smallholding there all the more puzzling.  Labor prices were, therefore,
probably not too high for managerial farming, but were they too low 
instead?  A few scholars have also suggested that Qing population growth
made managerial farms less profitable, mainly by lowering labor prices 
and making capital investment less attractive.104  But there is no reason 
why a managerial farm must be capital-intensive.  It could very well be
labor-intensive, yet enjoy higher productivity simply through more 
efficient management of labor and better use of previous capital 
investments.105 
One concern is that farms with more intensive labor input might be
harder to supervise, which leads to the broader question of whether 
managerial farms were too costly to supervise in China.  Such arguments
are rarely seen in the English-language literature,106 but merit consideration 
nonetheless. A preliminary variable to consider might be geographical 
segregation. Arable land might be too naturally scattered to cheaply
manage.  But this clearly was not true of North China or the Lower
Yangtze, which had reasonably concentrated and flat farmland.107  More
importantly, moral hazard issues can exist where the employee earns a
fixed wage, but his employer cannot efficiently monitor or control his 
behavior.108  The more hired labor a farm requires, the higher supervision 
103. LI WENZHI ET AL., supra note 24, at 215–17; HUANG (1990), supra note 24, at 
69–72. 
104. Zhao Gang, ZHONGGUO TUDI ZHIDU SHI, ch. 5 (2006); see also Martin Heijdra, 
The Socio-Economic Development of Rural China During the Ming, in 8 THE
CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF CHINA 417, 525–26 (Denis Twitchett & Frederick Mote eds., 
1998).
105. This certainly does not mean that Chinese farms made no capital
investments—quite the opposite, they made many, which further calls into question the 
theories in supra note 104. See discussion surrounding infra notes 327–29; see also
Kaoru Sugihara, Labour-intensive Industrialisation in Global History (Kyoto Working
Papers on Area Studies No. 1, 2007), available at www.cseas.kyoto-u.ac.jp/edit/ 
wp/Sugihara_WP_Web_081018.pdf (regarding the importance of labor-intensive 
production in global economic history). 
106. I find only one example: Heijdra, supra note 104, devotes one paragraph to
this.
 107. HUANG, supra note 11, at 53–66; HUANG, supra note 24, at 21–43. 
108. Mukesh Eswaran & Ashok Kotwal, A Theory of Contractual Structure in
Agriculture, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 352, 359–60 (1985) (arguing that, as long as
management costs are low, rational landowners will employ wage labor whenever their 
own managerial abilities outpaced those of their employed workers).  Since, as we have
discussed at pp. 142–43, labor and animal productivity were notably higher on managerial 
farms than on household-size ones, we may reasonably assume that this latter condition
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costs become.  When applied to Qing China, however, such concerns seem 
unnecessary.  Since most plots above 20 mu (3 acres) in Jiangnan were 
managerial, it would have taken around 10 minutes to walk around the 
basic managerial farm.109  A managerial farm in North China would have
been larger, but still small enough to circle in 30 minutes.110 In comparison, 
early modern English managerial farmers frequently managed 200 acres 
or more.111  Our question here is not why Chinese farms were not
managerial on the scale of English farms, but rather, why they were
generally not managerial at all, when even smaller managerial farms
enjoyed notable labor and animal productivity boosts.112 
A final economic explanation to consider is the potential attractiveness 
of risk-sharing—landowners with surplus land may tend to prefer a 
secure rent over a riskier crop yield.113  This theory also runs into empirical
difficulties.  Generally, we expect smaller landowners, who are more at risk
from economic fluctuations, to be more risk-averse than larger
landowners.114  In Qing China, however, we have shown that smaller
households who owned some surplus land, but not enough for managerial
farming, employed wage-labor regularly.115  This suggests that risk-sharing 
was probably not a prevalent priority for those who could afford managerial
farming.116 All things considered, purely economic considerations do
not seem capable of explaining China’s lack of managerial farming.
It must be noted, however, that many of the wealthiest landowners in 
the Lower Yangtze chose to become “absentee landlords” instead of 
managerial farmers, renting their holdings to tenants while living in
urban centers, preferring the comforts of urban life and the political and
commercial opportunities it offered.117 On the other hand, such
opportunities were largely limited to the highest echelon of landowners.118 
was met.  Kang Chao, Tenure Systems in Traditional China, 31 ECON. DEV. & CULT.
CHANGE 295 (1983) (sharecropping was in steady decline in China since at least 1500). 
109. See discussion supra p. 141. 
110. HUANG, supra note 11, at 70. 
111. Shaw-Taylor, supra note 25, at 4–6. 
112. See discussion supra p. 143. 
113. Heijdra, supra note 104. 
114. See Luigi Guiso & Monica Paiella, Risk Aversion, Wealth and Background 
Risk, 6 J. OF EURO. ECON. ASS’N 1109 (2008) (“We find that risk aversion is a decreasing
function of the endowment . . . .”). 
115. See discussion supra pp. 141–42. 
116. See Chao, supra note 108, at 312 (“There seems to be no strong statistical 
evidence to suggest that distribution of tenurial contracts was based on the consideration
of risk factors.”).
117. Madeleine Zelin, China’s Economy in Comparative Perspective, 1500
Onward, in ASIA IN WESTERN ANDWORLD HISTORY 474 (Ainslie Embree & Carol Gluck
eds., 1997).
118. Landlords probably constituted less than 5% of total population.  Esherick, 
supra note 65, at 405. 
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The vast majority of rural landowners and tenants regularly acted to
maximize their agricultural profits,119 which, as we argued, would have 
encouraged managerial farming, not rent-collecting.
There is some reason to suspect that even absentee landlords might
have shared these preferences120 and that they rented out their holdings
due to necessity, not choice.  As analyzed in detail below,121 the
landholdings of these large landlords were usually so scattered that 
managerial farming was not possible.  Instead of owning several large
plots, most large landowners owned dozens to hundreds of small and
unconnected plots, which could not efficiently support managerial farming
unless consolidated. I argue below that this was not by choice.  Rather,
they were unable to purchase land in more efficient patterns.122  The
prevalence of absentee landlordism among these large landowners does 
not, therefore, speak to the relative profitability of tenancy versus
managerial farming.  Rather, this latter option was inaccessible due to
external factors.
All in all, the fact that economic incentives actually favored the creation 
of managerial farms suggests that we should be looking for institutional 
obstacles. One approach, recently advocated by Robert Brenner and 
Christopher Isett, is to examine whether landlords possessed strong 
rights of exclusion against their tenants.123  Lower Yangtze tenants, for 
example, frequently enjoyed “permanent tenancy” (yong dian) rights, 
which protected them against exclusion and rent increases as long as
they paid their rents.  This right was strictly customary, since Qing
provincial laws often attempted to ban the practice, although with 
limited success.124  Brenner and Isett argue that these customs prevented 
Chinese landlords from excluding their tenants and creating large,
consolidated plots capable of supporting managerial farming.125 In 
comparison, British landlords had stronger exclusion powers, and were 
therefore able to build managerial farms.126 
119. See supra notes 12, 102. 
120. See discussion supra note 102. 
121. See discussion infra pp. 178–79. 
122. Id. 
123. Brenner & Isett, supra note 6, at 614–20. 
124. See, e.g., YANG GUOZHEN, MING QING TUDI QIYUE WENSHU YANJIU 115
(1988); PHILIP C.C. HUANG, CODE, CUSTOM AND LEGAL PRACTICE IN CHINA: THE QING 
AND REPUBLIC COMPARED 107–08 (2001). 
125. Brenner & Isett, supra note 6, at 614–20. 
126. Id.
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While the institutional contrast Brenner and Isett highlight probably
existed, the exclusion of tenants was simply not the primary means of
creating managerial farms even in England.  The general consensus
among English economic historians is that the initial creation of large 
farms during the sixteenth century was tenant-driven, instead of landlord- 
driven.127  In addition, even when landlords became the main force in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, they utilized both purchases and
exclusions to increase farm size.128  Thus, the principle mechanism by 
which plot-size increased was the combining of adjacent farms via either
outright purchase or mortgage closure, rather than exclusion of tenants.129 
Chinese landlords may well have possessed weaker exclusion rights, but 
this does not satisfactorily explain why China had less managerial
farming.  We must still ask why relatively richer peasants were unable to 
purchase enough land to create managerial farms, and especially why 
richer tenants did not, as they did in England, purchase enough tenancy
rights from poorer neighbors—there is certainly no rule against creating 
managerial farms on rented land.  Quite the opposite, the secure nature 
of tenancy rights in Qing China made this quite appealing.
One proposed solution is to emphasize the existence of lineage-based
obstacles to alienability.  Some have argued that local customs in both 
the Lower Yangtze and South China granted households the right of first 
refusal or even an outright veto power when their lineage members
attempted to sell land.130  In addition, lineage-owned land, which may 
have occupied as much as 35% of arable land in Guangdong, was simply
inalienable.131  Landowners therefore found it difficult to convey land
even if they wanted to, which naturally made buying land equally
difficult. English laws and customs seemed to impose fewer restrictions 
on free alienation. Legal historians have long agreed that, by at least the 
fifteenth century, royal and local courts expressed distinct hostility towards 
127. E.g. R.W. Hoyle, Tenure and the Land Market in Early Modern England: Or a
Late Contribution to the Brenner Debate, 43 ECON. HIST. REV. 1, 2, 14 (1990); P.
Glennie, Distinguishing Men’s Trades: Occupational Sources and Debates for 
Precensus England, in  HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY RESEARCH SERIES 1, 33 (1990). More
generally, see the discussion in Leigh Shaw-Taylor’s working paper on Agrarian
Capitalism, supra note 25. 
128. ALLEN, supra note 25, at 14–15. 
129. For the importance of mortgages in land transaction, see Christopher Clay, 
Property Settlements, Financial Provision for the Family, and Sale of Land by the 
Greater Landowners, 1660–1790, 21 J. BRIT. STUD. 18 (1981); ALLEN, supra note 25, at 
15. 
130. HUANG, supra note 24, at 108; MAZUMDAR, supra note 24, at 226–31; POMERANZ,
supra note 3, at 70. 
131. POMERANZ, supra note 3, at 71–72.
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inalienable rights in land, mainly by recognizing and creating methods to 
break entail.132 
Although this comparison of alienability is attractively straightforward, 
more recent scholarship suggests that it cannot adequately explain China’s
relative lack of managerial farming.  First, lineages in the Lower Yangtze 
and South China were generally so large that “kin first” rules, or even 
“kin only” rules, would still have allowed many potential buyers to compete 
for most plots.133  Second, although lineages owned a fair amount of
“corporate land” in Guangdong, their holdings were miniscule elsewhere, 
including the Lower Yangtze and North China.134  Finally, certain Medieval
English borough and manor customs gave family members and heirs a 
“right of first purchase” similar to what we see in China,135 suggesting 
that one should be cautious when arguing that kinship-based inalienability
was unique to China. 
Kenneth Pomeranz has recently suggested another way of measuring 
the economic effects of such customary restrictions.136  If, in fact, these 
restrictions constituted a significant barrier to free alienation, we would 
expect that, as individual households fluctuated in size, they would have
difficulty “adjusting the amount of land they worked to the amount of 
labor they possessed.”137  There should, therefore, be large differences in
labor input per-mu between different size classes.  Such variance should 
be particularly acute among small and medium farms, which employed 
little wage labor.  Some of Buck’s survey data present, however, a very
different picture. If labor input per-mu on small farms was set at 100, 
then it was around 95 on medium farms, and around 87 on large farms.138 
Disregarding the discrepancies within Buck’s data for the moment,139 
this suggests that customary restrictions placed no significant burden on
free land alienation.
 132. J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 318–21 (3d ed.
1990).
133. SUSAN NAQUIN & EVELYN RAWSKI, CHINESE SOCIETY IN THE EIGHTEENTH
CENTURY 100–01 (1987); POMERANZ, supra note 3, at 72. 
134. CHEN HAN-SENG, LANDLORD AND PEASANT IN CHINA 34–35 (1936); BUCK, 
supra note 67, at 192 (estimating that 93% of arable land in China was owned in “fee 
simple” by individual households). 
135. See, e.g., 21 PUBLICATIONS OF THE SELDEN SOCIETY 66–68. 
136. Pomeranz, supra note 87. 
137. Id.
 138. BUCK, supra note 70. 
139. See discussion supra pp. 142–43. 
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Finally, we should address the somewhat ancient thesis that differences
between Chinese and English inheritance norms allowed for greater
concentration of land-ownership in England.140  The basic idea is that, 
due to primogeniture and entail, English landowners were able to keep 
their holdings in one piece from generation to generation, while Chinese 
landowners, who customarily gave all sons equal inheritance, often saw 
their holdings split into smaller pieces by later generations.141  This  
institutional comparison is, first of all, highly questionable and ambiguous. 
The widespread use of wills, trusts, and various “entail breaking”
instruments in England since at least the fifteenth century allowed
landowners to easily secure land for younger sons despite primogeniture 
and entail,142 while Chinese cultural and customary traditions that
promoted lineage solidarity often discouraged sons from disintegrating 
family property.143 
Even if we unwisely disregard these complexities, the logical connection 
between family division and the prevalence of managerial farming would 
still be tenuous. A family that possesses both a managerial farm and
multiple male heirs—who constitute the bulk of the household labor
supply—would only create a number of smaller managerial farms after 
140. See  NAGANO AKIRA, ZHONGGUO TUDI ZHIDU DE YANJIU 66 (Qiang Wo trans.,
2004); William Lavely & R. Bin Wong, Family Division and Mobility in North China, 
34 COMP. STUD. IN SOC. & HIST. 439, 448 (1992); DAVID WAKEFIELD, FENJIA:
HOUSEHOLD DIVISION AND INHERITANCE IN QING AND REPUBLICAN CHINA 188–91;
CHRISTOPHER ISETT, STATE, PEASANT, AND MERCHANT IN QING MANCHURIA, 1644–1862,
at 173.  The more recent works argue that Chinese family division had negative effects 
on productivity and earning potential, which is undoubtedly correct, but do not explicitly
link these effects to China’s relative lack of managerial farming.  In an earlier work, 
Huang briefly suggests that partible inheritance obstructed managerial farming, but then
immediately states that the effects of population growth and farm division were 
“ambiguous,” as they could also pressure more households to sell their land due to poverty.
HUANG, supra note 11, at 117–18.  For a summary of eighteenth and nineteenth century
English academic thinking on primogeniture and entail, see William L. Miller,
Primogeniture, entails and endowments in English classical economics, 12 HIST. OF POL.
ECON. 558 (1980). 
141. NAGANO, supra note 140. 
142. For a discussion of how trusts were used to avoid primogeniture, see Kent D.
Schenkel, Trust Law and the Title-Split: A Beneficial Perspective, 78 U. OF MO.-KAN.
CITY L. REV. 181, 185–191 (2009).  The ineffectiveness of entail is discussed at G.R.
RUBIN & DAVID SUGARMAN, LAW, ECONOMY, AND SOCIETY, 1750–1914: ESSAYS IN THE
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 39 (1984). See ALAN MACFARLANE, THE ORIGINS OF ENGLISH 
INDIVIDUALISM: FAMILY, PROPERTY, AND SOCIAL TRANSITION (1978), which argues that 
the widespread use of wills and trusts made institutions like primogeniture largely 
ineffective. See also id. at 104. 
143. NAGANO, supra note 140, at 122.  See also the case discussed at K.Y. Wong, 
Dispute Resolution by Officials in Traditional Chinese Legal Culture, 10 MURDOCH U.
ELEC J.L. No. 2, at § 8, available at http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v10n2/ 
wong102_text.html (2003).  The official was applauded for preventing family division, 
even though the brothers were within their rights to seek it. 
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household division.  For example, a managerial farm with two male
heirs and four hired laborers would create two managerial farms with
one owner and two laborers each after division.  On the other hand, if
family division led to the creation of two non-managerial farms, then
logically the original undivided farm could not have been managerial 
either. Family division does not, therefore, affect the total amount or 
percentage of Chinese farmland under managerial farming.  Managerial
farming exists if, and only if, household labor tills less than half the plot. 
If household labor were not expanding in the first place, there would 
probably be no need for family division.
None of this is to say that family division had no impact on per-capita 
wealth—by dividing family assets, households would lose some economies
of scale, mainly in the form of lower labor productivity.  This clearly 
affected future earning potential, but as pointed out above, lower
productivity also meant that it took less land per-capita to create
managerial farms.  While a unified household with two sons might need
to own 22 mu/person to create a managerial farm, this threshold might 
drop to 20 mu/person after family division, as each son was no longer 
capable of farming as much land on his own.  This mathematically
cancelled out the drop in earning potential. 
Moreover, family division becomes macro-economically significant 
only when there is substantial population growth, but North China and
the Lower Yangtze often failed to satisfy this prerequisite.  Population
growth in these two regions was dramatically slower than the national
average due to outward migration.144  The population of the Lower
Yangtze grew by perhaps 35% from 1750 to 1850, much of it in urban
areas, whereas the national average might have been around 80%.145  It 
then fell by over 25% between 1850 and 1930—back to 1750 levels, 
while the national average was still steadily increasing.146  A similar 
situation existed in North China, where the population of Zhili Province,
 144. HO PING-TI, STUDIES ON THE POPULATION OF CHINA, 1368–1953, at 136–68 
(1959).
145. For the Lower Yangtze, see HUANG JINGBIN, MINSHENG YU JIAJI: QINGCHU ZHI
MINGUO SHIQI JIANGNAN JUMIN DE XIAOFEI 70–71 (2009).  Population growth in urban
areas was much faster than elsewhere, further lessening the effect of family division on 
agriculture.  Id. at 17. For national figures, see Robert B. Marks, China’s Population
Size during the Ming and Qing 3, available at http://web.whittier.edu/people/webpages/ 
personalwebpages/rmarks/pdf/env.panel_remarks.pdf (last visited Nov. 29, 2010). 
146. HUANG, supra note 145. 
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for example, hardly grew at all before 1850.147  All in all, existing 
institutional explanations seem incapable of explaining China’s relative 
lack of managerial farming.
IV. CONDITIONAL SALES IN QING AND REPUBLICAN CHINA
This hardly means, however, that it is impossible to craft a plausible 
institutional explanation. The theories examined above focus mainly on
whether Chinese peasants could permanently sell land, and not whether 
they actually would. The remainder of this article argues that the main
problem with Chinese property rights was, in fact, that peasants could 
transact their land in ways that English law did not allow, and that this 
created problematic incentives, chiefly for the potential seller.  In particular, 
we should pay greater attention to the existence of conditional sales 
(dian), which allowed reluctant sellers to retain rights of redemption— 
at, in fact, the original sale price—for as long as they chose. 
The relationship between this somewhat peculiar “institution” and 
China’s relative lack of managerial farming remains severely 
underdeveloped.  Although a few scholars have alluded to it, no serious 
analysis exists.  Liang Zhiping, for example, suggests that conditional 
sales could have prevented land accumulation, but provides no economic 
data or reasoning to support this brief assertion.148  An article by Pomeranz
briefly expresses support for Liang’s claims, yet goes on to argue that
conditional sales really had little effect on land purchasing.149  Isett’s
recent book on the Manchurian economy discusses both conditional
sales and the lack of managerial farming without drawing a specific
casual relation between them.150  In any case, what applies to Manchuria
does not necessarily apply to North China or the Lower Yangtze.  If
conditional sales did indeed affect managerial farming in the Chinese 
core, the existing literature has yet to adequately explain how.  Moreover, 
no previous work has attempted to compare conditional sales with English 
norms of land transaction.  Rigorous comparison is, however, logically
necessary if we are to tackle Sino-English agricultural divergence. 
Qing and Republican conditional land sales were conceptually simple:
the original owner “sold” land under the condition that he could later 
147. Xing Long, Jindai Huabei Nongcun Renkou Liudong ji qi Xiaozhang, 2000 (4)
LISHI YANJIU, available at http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article 
=1109&context=student_papers&sei-redir=1#search=%22Xing%20Long%2C%20Jindai 
%20Huabei%20Nongcun%20Renkou%20Liudong%20ji%20qi%20Xiaozhang%22. 
148. LIANG ZHIPING, QINGDAI XIGUAN FA: SHEHUI YU GUOJIA 173–78 (1996). 
149. Pomeranz, supra note 87, at 105, 123–30. 
150. ISETT, supra note 140, at 85–89, 161–72. 
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redeem it at the original price.151  Tenants, who generally enjoyed decent
security of tenure in China’s economic core, could also transfer their
rights of possession through these instruments.152  In either situation, the
buyer could utilize the land as he wished until redemption.153 Such
contracts might specify, as a benefit to the conditional buyer, a period of
time (xian) in which he was guaranteed usage of the land.154  The seller 
could potentially reimburse the initial payment before this period expired, 
but could only regain usage rights after the expiration.155  On the other
hand, he was under no obligation to redeem immediately upon the
expiration; as long as the contract did not expressly set a deadline for
redemption, he could redeem at “any time after the guaranteed-usage
period had expired.”156 
In any kind of conditional sale, the seller might decide to part with this 
right of redemption, either because he could not afford to redeem, or
because he had simply lost interest in the land.  When this happened, the
conditional buyer would obtain full ownership rights, but would have to
pay the seller an “additional payment” (zhao tie), equal to the difference 
between the original conditional sale price and the present market value
of the land.157 
Naturally, complications arose in actual practice.  Most important was 
the issue of redemption: could the parties set a deadline for redemption? If
the original contract did not expressly mention the deadline issue, would
a default deadline apply, either by law or by custom? The few historians 
who have studied these issues share little consensus. Some argue that 
151. Both the Qing Code and the earlier Ming Code simply define “dian” as a sale 
that could be redeemed. DA QING LV LI [THE GREAT QING CODE] 95.03 (1905); DA 
MING LV [THE GREAT MING CODE], Hu Lv: Tian Zhai Men. On redemption at the 
original price, see LIANG, supra note 148, at 93 (1996); WU XIANGHONG, DIAN ZHI
FENGSU YU DIAN ZHI FALV 35 (2009).
152. See discussion supra accompanying note 83.  Tenants were free to transfer or 
sublease their tenancy rights.  See Pomeranz, supra note 87, at 131. 
153. This would be buyer’s incentive for participating in the sale despite not 
obtaining any interest on his “loan” (redemption was at the original price)—the lump
sum he conveyed to the seller.  See WU, supra note 151, at 100–03. 
154. LIANG, supra note 148; Henry McAleavy, Dien in China and Vietnam, 17 J.
ASIAN ST. 403, 406–07 (1958).  Some have mistakenly interpreted “xian” as a deadline 
for redemption. See, e.g., discussion at infra notes 199, 200.  But this would conflict 
with any reasonable reading of either customary or legal sources.  See discussion infra
notes 187, 206. See also WU, supra note 151, at 100–03. 
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. These practices are summarized at HUANG (2001), supra note 124, at 74–75. 
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norms on all levels, from the Qing Code down to local custom, approached
conditional sales from a basic presumption of permanent land-ownership 
and, therefore, protected strong redemption rights.158  Others counter that
Qing laws and customs were not hostile to the permanent alienation of 
land, while large numbers of people freely engaged in complex land
transactions for pure financial gain.159 
A more comprehensive survey of relevant law and custom suggests
that the actual situation fell somewhere in the middle.  Local customs in
the regions we study do indeed display a prevalent social sympathy for 
attempts to maintain permanent land-ownership.  They generally did not
recognize redemption deadlines, permitting conditional sellers to retain
redemption rights indefinitely.  Central-level authorities, however, were 
hostile to such practices and banned redemption after eleven years.  Faced 
with this conflict between law and custom, local magistrates generally 
left conditional land sale disputes to local mediation.  While probably 
just a prudent act of self-preservation, this nonetheless shielded local
customs from hostile legal regulations.  Qing and Republican property
rights did, therefore, favor strong redemption rights in practice, even
though they may have opposed them as a matter of formal legal theory.
Section IV.A examines how county-level customs throughout China 
regulated conditional sales contracts.  Section IV.B then describes how
the Qing Code and other central regulations treated such transactions.
Due to the lack of a new civil code after the Qing collapse, these rules
remained in effect until the mid-Republican era.160  Section IV.C argues
that local courts very rarely enforced these laws and regulations that 
contradicted local customs.
A. Local Custom 
The term “custom,” as legal historians generally use it, is medieval 
European in origin.  It refers to “rule[s] acknowledged by the population 
of a particular locality as having a binding force.”161  As the medieval 
158. HUANG (2001), supra note 124, at 71–98.  See also, MELISSA MACAULEY,
SOCIAL POWER AND LEGAL CULTURE: LITIGATION MASTERS IN LATE IMPERIAL CHINA
230–45 (1998); YANG, supra note 124, at 279; Yang Guozhen, Shilun Qingdai Minbei
Minjian de Tudi Maimai, 1 ZHONGGUOSHI YANJIU 29 (1981). 
159. THOMAS BUOYE, MANSLAUGHTER, MARKETS AND MORAL ECONOMY: VIOLENT
DISPUTES OVER PROPERTY RIGHTS IN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY CHINA 94 (2000); POMERANZ, 
supra note 3, at 70–73. 
160. Late-Qing and early-Republican judicial reform efforts succeeded partially in
constructing new courts and legal procedures, but were unable to seriously revise
substantive civil law until the issuance of a new civil code in 1929.  HUANG (2001), 
supra note 124, at 47–48. 
161. Jerome Bourgon, Uncivil Dialouge: Law and Custom Did Not Merge into Civil
Law under the Qing, 23 LATE IMPERIAL CHINA 50, 53 (2002). 
158
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Canonists saw it, “custom resonate[d] within law, while ordinary practice 
pertain[ed] to the domain of fact.”162  In essence, a custom was a habitual
practice that had acquired normative status.163  It may be—as so many 
legal or social-science concepts are—a weberian “ideal type,”164 but this
does not necessarily detract from its usefulness in describing, however
approximately, rules that govern social behavior, either due to fear of
sanction or internalization,165 rather than merely describe it.  Modern 
property rights scholars often call these rules “social norms,”166 but legal
historians probably remain more familiar with the term “custom.” 
Although “custom,” a concept of western origin, might have no
straightforward equivalent in Qing legal terminology,167 it would 
nonetheless be foolish to assume that Qing localities had no normative 
custom of their own.  After all, conditional sales had been perhaps the most
popular form of land transaction for longer than the dynasty itself,168 but 
central regulation was sparse until the eighteenth century.169  The myriad 
of disputes triggered by conditional sales were somehow resolved in the 
absence of formal law, allowing ample opportunity for the development 
of local custom.  Existing sources, most importantly a number of early
twentieth century surveys,170 do indeed indicate the existence of well-
established customs in the Qing.171 
162. Id. at 54. 
163. Id.
 164. MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETATIVE
SOCIOLOGY 20–21(Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., Ephraim Fischoff et al. trans., 
Bedminster Press 1968). 
165. Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 
MICH. L. REV. 338, 340 (1997). 
166. Id.; see also discussion supra pp. 135–36.
167. The term did not enjoy widespread use in China until the early twentieth 
century.  SUI HONGMING, QINGMO MINCHU MINSHANGSHI XIGUAN DIAOCHA ZHI YANJIU
18–76 (2005).  Academic attempts to search for references to “custom” in Qing
adjudication have often been overzealous, overlooking the possibility that those 
references were merely observations of habitual social fact, not norms.  Shiga Shuzo,
Qingdai Susong Zhidu zhi Minshi Fayuan de Kaocha, in  MING QING SHIQI DE MINSHI
SHENPAN YU MINJIAN QIYUE 54 (Wang Yaxin & Liang Zhiping eds., Wang Yaxin trans., 
1998).
168. Yang (1981), supra note 158, at 31. 
169. See discussion infra pp. 156–59. 
170. MINSHANGSHI XIGUAN DIAOCHA BAOGAOLU [hereinafter XGDC] (Sifa
Xingzheng Bu ed., 1930). 
171. As early as the Ming Dynasty, scholars and officials had encouraged local 
communities to establish “county pacts” (xiang yue) as a source of order and regulation.
Terada Hiroaki, Ming Qing Shiqi Fazhixu zhong de “Yue” de Xingzhi, in  MING QING 
SHIQI DE MINSHI SHENPAN YU MINJIAN QIYUE, supra note 167, at 178.  See also WILLIAM
 159
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The surveys were initiated in 1903 by the Qing court, but not completed 
until 1923.172 The original intent, shared by both Qing and Republican
authorities, was to gather information for the drafting of a new civil 
code.173  The researchers in charge explicitly sought to identify local
“customs” (xiguan) that possessed binding force,174 and indeed produced
a vast collection of local practices that, at least as presented in the final
report, were clearly normative in nature.  Numerous researchers commented
on the “binding force” of certain customs, or how they could be used to 
“combat” non-conforming actions.175  Republican era jurists took the
normative nature of these customs seriously enough to designate them a 
formal source of law in the new 1929 Civil Code: “where the Code is 
silent, the courts shall apply custom.”176 At the time, the survey reports
were the only extensive compilation of Chinese custom in existence. 
Despite the geographical diversity of the survey, which covered most 
of the country, its reports on conditional sales revealed considerable 
uniformity among local customs.  Nearly all surveyed counties, for
example, had customary prohibitions against redeeming conditionally
sold land between the initial sowing of seeds and the final harvest.177 
Most prohibited early redemption if the contract had set a guaranteed-
usage period.178  More importantly for the purposes of this paper, almost 
none of the several hundred surveyed counties—and, indeed, only one
county in North China or the Lower Yangtze—imposed any customary
deadline on redemption.179  Instead, the near-universal assumption seemed
ROWE, SAVING THE WORLD: CHEN HONGMOU AND ELITE CONSCIOUSNESS IN EIGHTEENTH-
CENTURY CHINA 102–03 (2003) (discussing the positive assessment of “xiangyue” by
prominent officials).  The local creation of written custom was prevalent in the Qing.
Terada, supra; SUN LIJUAN, QINGDAI SHANGYE SHEHUI DE GUIZE YU ZHIXU: CONG BEIKE
ZILIAO JIEDU QINGDAI ZHONGGUO SHANGSHI XIGUAN FA (2005) (discussing tablet 
engravings of local commercial customs). 
172. SUI, supra note 167. 
173. Id. at 18–19, 58–59. 
174. Id. at 13, 18–19, 30–31. 
175. XGDC supra note 170, at 153, 175, 194, 364. 
176. THE CIVIL CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA art. 1 (1930). 
177. See, e.g., XGDC, supra note 170, at 28, 30, 40, 67, 79, 84, 132, 141, 153, 157, 
175, 194, 257, 291, 349, 418. 
178. These were common.  See, e.g., XGDC, supra note 170, at 141, 153, 157, 175, 
194, 257, 278, 279, 291. Exceptions include XGDC, supra note 170, at 225, 488, 234, 
262 and 547, which allowed redemption at any time, regardless of any contractually
established guaranteed usage period. 
179. Deqing County, Zhejiang Province, guaranteed the ability to redeem for only
thirty years, which would still be unimaginably long by the English standards discussed
below in Part IV.  XGDC, supra note 170, at 480–81.  I can only find two other counties 
that imposed a mandatory deadline, both in Gansu Province.  Xunhua imposed a three or 
five year redemption deadline for all conditional sales.  Jingyuan capped the ability to 
redeem at sixty years. XGDC, supra note 170, at 684, 695.  Numerous other counties in 
160
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to be that redemption rights would exist indefinitely, and could be
exercised in any year after the guaranteed usage period, if one existed.
As a Fujian custom stated, conditional sales of land “could be redeemed
even after several dozen or even several hundred years, and the price of 
redemption would always remain the same regardless of changes in land 
value.”180  While such extreme language was rare, customs that expressly 
made redemption possible “at any time” existed in all reporting provinces,
and were particularly abundant in North China, the Middle and Lower 
Yangtze, and South China.181  Many explicitly forbid the original contract 
from setting any redemption deadline.182 Most other customs simply stated
that redemption rights could be exercised “anytime after the guaranteed-
usage period’s expiration.”183  The assumption seemed to be that no
deadline for redemption would be made, which was indeed the case in
actual practice.  As several scholars have observed, the typical Qing dian
contract in most regions would set a period of guaranteed usage, but no 
deadline for redemption.184  Quite the opposite, it was common practice
in North China and the Middle and Lower Yangtze for dian contracts to
incorporate some version of the following: “If there is not enough cash
to redeem [after the guaranteed usage period had passed], the buyer will
continue to till the land with no deadline.  Once the original amount has
been paid, the land will revert to the original owner.”185  On the other
hand, a very small number of counties did expressly limit indefinite
redeemability to contracts that imposed no clear deadline.186  The contrast is
quite distinct. 
Gansu supported unlimited ability to redeem. See, e.g., XGDC, supra note 170, at 690, 
691, 696. 
180. XGDC, supra note 170, at 505. 
181. A partial list: XGDC, supra note 170, at 28, 29, 67, 81, 225, 234, 262, 319, 
356, 364, 370, 488, 505, 524, 547, 570, 586, 600, 631 (dealing explicitly with burial 
grounds), 645, 646, 690, 691, 696, 722, 822, 1160. 
182. Examples from supra note 181 include XGDC 234, 262, 524, 547. 
183. Examples include every custom cited in supra note 181, except those also cited 
in supra note 182. 
184. LIANG, supra note 148; Isett, supra note 140, at 88.  See also the North China 
custom discussed at XGDC, supra note 170, at 232 (clarifying that the original owner
could not be compelled to surrender his redemption rights upon the termination of the 
guaranteed-usage period). 
185. TIANCANG QIYUE WENSHU CUIBIAN (Hugh T. Scogin & Zheng Qing eds., 
2001): nos. 17, 71, 91, 130, 198, 279; XGDC, supra note 170, at 312. 
186. I can find only three examples of this: XGDC, supra note 170, at 586, 688, 
818. 
 161
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Other counties prohibited redemption during guaranteed usage periods 
and between sowing and harvest, but made no express statement on
redemption deadlines.187  Some do comment that, if the seller failed to
redeem before sowing time, “he would have to wait until the following 
year,” implying that redemption rights were viable for some extended 
period of time.188  We can interpret this relative silence either to indicate 
an unspoken adherence to the formal Qing law, or simply to mean that 
no customary deadline existed.  Default adherence to Qing law seems fairly 
unlikely. For example, numerous customs expressly prohibited redemption 
during guaranteed usage periods189 even though the Qing Code carried
an identical prohibition,190 which would make little sense if default
adherence was assumed.  More plausibly, silence on redemption deadlines 
simply meant that none existed by custom, especially since the great
majority of contracts, as mentioned above, also decline to impose any
deadline. 
All in all, these custom surveys clearly suggest that most local
communities in the Chinese core supported indefinite redeemability.191 
A few localities, in fact, went a step further and prohibited permanent
land selling of any kind: even irrevocable sales could be redeemed as 
long the original owner still possessed a copy of his original deed.192 
Social historians will notice that the widespread existence of indefinite
redeemability customs fit in with cultural perceptions of land in Qing 
society.  Ownership of land was a “very personal thing” for most Qing 
farmers, as it was in many pre-industrial societies.193 Land “shared in 
the individual and social nature of the owner.”194 
The uniformity of such customs across geographical regions indicates
that the practice had very deep social and historical roots, and had 
therefore existed long before the late-Qing custom surveys.  Indeed, as 
will be discussed shortly, Qing officials had been attempting to limit
rights of redemption since the mid-Qianlong era—a campaign that 
Republican governments carried on well into the twentieth century,195 
suggesting that such norms were a widespread “problem” by at least the
187. This list is very long.  See, e.g., XGDC, supra note 170, at 141, 153, 157, 175, 
194, 257, 278, 279, 291. 
188. See, e.g., XGDC, supra note 170, at 55, 378, 548, 291, 940. 
189. See supra note 178. 
190. See discussion supra p. 156. 
191. The immediate audience of these surveys, Republican lawmakers, would have
agreed with our observations.  See discussing surrounding infra notes 256, 257. 
192. See, e.g., XGDC, supra note 170, at 28, 225, 319,. 
193. MACAULEY, supra note 158, at 234. 
194. Eduard Kroker, The Concept of Property in Chinese Customary Law, 3 
TRANSACTIONS OF THE ASIATIC SOC’Y OF JAPAN 123, 127–31. 
195. See discussion supra pp. 156–59, see also discussion infra p. 164. 
162
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mid-eighteenth century.196  The reluctance of later-Qing magistrates to 
enforce these official regulations further confirms this impression.197 
The idea that Qing and Republican society favored permanent
landownership ideals has encountered some recent criticism. For 
example, based on surveys of provincial homicide cases, Thomas Buoye 
claims that Qing landowners often made conditional sales “to raise cash
to invest in trade or business,” and in increasingly “innovative” ways
that “indicated a good deal of commercial savvy.”198  This suggests, he
claims, that the ideal of permanent landownership was in decline. These 
observations are not, however, logically inconsistent with the arguments 
in this article.  Even if landowners became more open to complex 
conditional sales, they could nonetheless have assumed that no permanent 
loss of land would occur.  In fact, customary protection of redemption
rights might actually have encouraged “innovative” conditional sales; 
since the risk of permanently losing the land was low, landowners felt 
less wary towards such transactions.  Oddly, Buoye does not discuss the
content or operation of any actual local custom. 
Contrary to our observations in this section, some scholars have argued 
that most conditional sale contracts in the Lower Yangtze did contain a 
contractual deadline—usually three or five years—for redemption.199 
This seems to stem, however, from a misinterpretation of contractual
language.  They note, for example, that certain Anhui contracts contained
the clause “can be redeemed after three years,” interpreting this to mean
that the seller must redeem within three years.200  The various sources
examined above, however, make it abundantly clear that such language 
almost always meant “cannot redeem within three years,” but says 
nothing about redemption deadlines.201 
B. The Qing Code and Other Central Regulations 
Compared to the seller-friendly tendencies of most local customs,
formal Qing civil law came to exhibit considerable hostility towards the 
196. See supra pp. 28–31. 
197. See discussion supra pp. 159–62; see also discussion infra p. 164. 
198. Thomas Buoye, Litigation, Legitimacy, and Lethal Violence, in CONTRACT AND 
PROPERTY, supra note 13, at 94, 106, 113; BUOYE, supra note 159, at 94. 
199. Pomeranz, supra note 87, at 130–31; ZHOU YUANLIAN & XIE ZHAOHUA,
QINGDAI ZUDIANZHI YANJIU 312–13 (1986); HUANG (1985), supra note 11, at 176. 
200. ZHOU & XIE, supra note 199. 
201. See discussion supra notes 154, 187, and infra note 206. 
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unlimited redemption of conditional sales, although this was a slow and 
extended process.  Earlier editions of the Qing Code make little mention 
of conditional sales.  The central statute on this subject was statute 95, 
“Conditional Sales of Land or Real Estate” (Dian Mai Tian Zhai), which 
sets three rules.202  First, the conditional buyer must register the contract
with local officials and pay the accompanying tax.203  Second, the buyer
must not impede redemption after the guaranteed usage period has passed. 
Third, the conditional seller must not sell the contracted land to any other
party before he fully redeemed it.  These are, of course, very narrow rules
that fail to address most conditional sales-related complications. 
Realizing these inadequacies, the Qing Court issued several addendums
during the eighteenth century.  The first, promulgated in 1730, banned
the redemption of sales expressly labeled as “irrevocable sale.”  If no such 
phrase existed, or if the contract “set a guaranteed usage period,” “then
the property shall be redeemable.”204  In addition, should the conditional
seller eventually decide to irrevocably sell his land to the conditional buyer,
he could henceforth demand only one additional payment.205  Finally,
any attempt by the seller to prematurely redeem before the guaranteed
usage period had expired would carry criminal liability.206 
A 1744 addition by Emperor Qianlong attempted to further crack
down on ambiguously worded contracts that failed to specify whether 
the sale was redeemable or not, banning redemption of such contracts if 
“a long time has already passed.”207  This vague edict paved the path for
a more detailed 1753 sub-statute, which stipulated that any ambiguous 
contract made after 1723, but before 1753, could be “redeemed in
accordance with this sub-statute.”208  Ambiguous contracts made before
1723 would, however, be considered irrevocable sales that carried no
possibility of either redemption or additional payment.  From 1753
onwards, all new contracts were required to expressly indicate their legal
status, either as a dian or a jue mai, through the phrases “to be redeemed” or
“sold irrevocably, never to be redeemed.”209
 202. DA QING LV LI [THE GREAT QING CODE] [hereinafter DQLL] 95.00 (1905). 
203. Later edicts effectively voided this rule by granting tax exemptions to dian
contracts. Id. at 95–109. 
204. Id. at 95–103. 
205. Id.
206. Id.
 207. 14 QING SHILU, at ch. 436 (1985). 
208. DQLL, supra note 202, at 95–107. 
209. Some scholars have proposed a more ambitious but somewhat less literal
interpretation: the sub-statute meant that any ambiguous contract, whether drawn before 
or after 1753, would be presumed redeemable for thirty years. HUANG (2001), supra
note 124, at 74; MACAULEY, supra note 158, at 240–41.  The evidence is drawn from a 
paper by Kishimito Mio, which records three murder cases from the Xing’an Huilan that
purportedly adjudicated “according to the 30-year rule.”  HUANG (2001), supra note 124,
164
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The Qing Code clearly left a substantial amount of contractual freedom to
private parties.  Most importantly, it did not set any absolute maximum 
on redemption deadlines or require that contracts specify a deadline.  Philip 
Huang, for one, considers this lack of regulation a commitment to “a
precommercial ideal of permanence in landholding.”210  A few scholars  
have disagreed,211 but the sub-statutes did seem to at least tolerate that
ideal. 
While this is certainly a reasonable reading of the Code, the Code itself 
hardly presents a comprehensive and accurate view of Qing conditional
sales regulation.  Most scholarship in English, with a few exceptions,212 
seems to assume, either implicitly or explicitly, that the Code constituted 
the only Qing legal authority on conditional sales.213  Chinese and 
Japanese scholars have done better in recent decades.  Most importantly, 
they have given the Board of Finance Regulations (Hubu Zeli) some
well-deserved attention.214  This was a set of regulations issued by the
at 74. None of the three cases expressly applied any such rule.  Instead, they simply
ruled that, since the original contracts were ambiguous and too much time had passed, 
the land in question was no long redeemable.  Kishimito Mio, Ming Qing Shidai de 
“Zhaojia Huishu” Wenti, in III-4 ZHONGGUO FAZHISHI KAOZHENG 423, 457–58 (Terada 
Hiroaki ed., Zheng Minqin trans., 2003).  They do not tell us whether those contracts 
were made before or after 1753.  There is, therefore, no way to identify the precise 
statutory rationale of the judgment.  See also Terada Hiroaki, Shindai Chuuki no Ten
Kisei ni Mieru Kigen no Imi ni, in  TOUYOU HOSHI NO TANKYUU 339, 347–51 (1987) 
(refuting any attempt to apply DQLL, supra, note 202, at 95–107 to post-1753 
contracts).
210. HUANG (2001), supra note 124, at 74. 
211. See, e.g., Buoye, Litigation, Legitimacy, and Lethal Violence: Why County 
Courts Failed to Prevent Violent Disputes over Property in Eighteenth-Century China, 
in CONTRACT AND PROPERTY 106. 
212. Henry McAleavy does not explicitly discuss any other legal authority, but
does, based on the Taiwan Shiho, notice the existence of the crucial “ten year rule” in the
Hubu Zeli, discussed below. McAleavy, supra note 154, at 410–11.  Macauley does
recognize the existence of the Hubu Zeli as an alternative source of legal regulation, but 
does not mention the “ten year rule.” MACAULEY, supra note 158, at 241. 
213. See, e.g., HUANG (2001), supra note 124, at 88–89; Buoye, supra note 211. 
Neither of the two main essay collections in the Chinese legal history field mentions any 
statutory source other than the Qing Code and some scattered edict collections in their
bibliographies.  See CIVIL LAW IN QING AND REPUBLICAN CHINA (Kathryn Bernhardt & 
Philip C.C. Huang eds., 1994); CONTRACT AND PROPERTY IN EARLY MODERN CHINA, 
supra note 13. 
214. See, e.g., Lin Qian & Zhang Jinfan, Hubu Zeli de Falv Shiyong, 5 FAXUE
QIANYAN 197 (2003), available at http://www.legalhistory.com.cn/index.php?option= 
com_content&view=article&id=827:n&catid=40:2011-03-05-16-10-18&Itemid=41; 8
ZHONGGUO FAZHI TONGSHI 436 (Zhang Jinfan ed., 1999); ZHONGGUO MINFA SHI 60–03 
(Kong Qingming, Hu Liuyuan & Sun Jiping eds., 1996); Terada, supra note 209, at 352–60. 
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Board of Finance at five-year intervals, beginning in 1776.  Since the 
Board of Finance’s official duties centered on the administration of land
and tax, these regulations naturally focused on similar issues. By the
end of Qianlong’s reign, they had become crucial parts of the Qing legal
apparatus by and were binding over all levels of government adjudication.215 
The Qianlong series of Board of Finance Regulations (Regulations) 
made two crucial changes to conditional sales law. First, the Regulations
now allowed the buyer of a dian to sell his conditional ownership,216 
upon which the third-party purchaser would assume all the rights and
obligations of the original buyer.  Second, and more drastically, if the
conditional seller failed to redeem within eleven years of the original
sale, the conditional buyer could claim full ownership by assuming tax 
responsibilities for the property (tou shui guo hu).217  After ten years, the 
seller could ask for, at most, a one-year extension, after which redemption
would be at the discretion of the buyer.218  There was one exception: 
when bannermen sold land to commoners, they were guaranteed redemption
rights for twenty years.219 
Court documents claim that the official legislative intent was to
“eliminate social conflict” and “prevent litigation.”220  Recalling the
widespread protection of indefinite redeemability by local customs, these 
somewhat cryptic phrases seem to suggest that the central government
was indeed aware of those customs and, moreover, felt burdened by the
social disputes they frequently generated.  Quite possibly, these regulations
amounted to a direct and conscious assault on customary rights of dian-
redemption. 
One might question whether “eliminating social conflict” and “preventing 
litigation” really was the main motivation behind these regulations, but
 215. Lin & Zhang, supra note 214. 
216. 1 QINGDAI GE BUYUAN ZELI: QINDING HUBU ZELI (QIANLONG CHAO)
[hereinafter HBZL] 148 (Fuchi Shuyuan ed., 2004). 
217. Id. at 83, 148–49.; ZHONGGUO FAZHI TONGSHI, supra note 214, at 435; Terada, 
supra note 209, at 357–58.  There has been some debate over whether this ten-year limit 
was a deadline for redemption or merely an upper limit for guaranteed usage periods—
the language is somewhat ambiguous and could support either interpretation.  See  GUO
JIAN, DIAN QUAN ZHIDU YUANLIU KAO 196 (2009) (supporting the latter interpretation); 
Terada, supra note 209, at 357–58 (supporting a version of the former interpretation, in
which the buyer could terminate the seller’s right of redemption after eleven years, if he
chose to). However, discussions of the rule in imperial memorials, in which officials 
pleaded with the Jiaqing Emperor to allow impoverished bannermen to retain redemption 
rights after the eleven-year deadline, make it fairly clear that Qing officials, at least,
tended to follow the former interpretation.  Lin Qian & Zhang Jinfan, supra note 214 at 
§ 3. I see no solid reason to challenge them. 
218. ZHONGGUO FAZHI TONGSHI, supra note 214, at 435.  The buyer did not have to
exercise this claim immediately.  Terada, supra note 214, at 357–58. 
219. ZHONGGUO FAZHI TONGSHI, supra note 214, at 435. 
220. Lin & Zhang, supra note 214, at Part 3. 
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there is no solid reason to assume otherwise.  Qing local government
famously suffered from an extraordinary lack of both financial and
human resources.221  This was at least partially a conscious decision by 
the central government. In an attempt to streamline the bureaucracy, the 
Qing court made it a general policy to withdraw from direct management of
local economic and social affairs, leaving tax-collection, dispute settlement,
and even limited rulemaking powers to local guilds, lineages, and other 
social groups.222  Compared with earlier dynasties, the Qing employed 
roughly the same number of local officials despite dealing with a population 
that was several times larger.223  “Preventing litigation” was, therefore, a
real and pressing issue. 
Combined with the Qing Code, the Board of Finance Regulations put 
forth a set of rules that was distinctly intolerant of permanent landownership
ideals. No matter the circumstance or contractual language, conditional 
sellers had at most ten (or twenty) years to redeem, and could receive
only one additional payment if they made the sale irrevocable. The
drafters of these rules were quite willing to sacrifice the conditional 
seller’s ability to maintain ownership for legal clarity and perhaps
administrative simplicity.  This is a drastically different picture than
what the Qing Code offers on its own, and one that has unfortunately
escaped Western academic attention for the most part.
221. The literature is enormous, but this basic observation remains unchallenged.
Two of the more famous works are CH’U TUNG-TSU, LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN CHINA 
UNDER THE CH’ING 24–32 (1962); and BRADLEY W. REED, TALONS AND TEETH: COUNTY
CLERKS AND RUNNERS IN THE QING DYNASTY 169–70 (2000), both of which argue that
local magistrates suffered from resource limitations so acute that they had very little 
coercive power over local communities.
222. See ROWE, supra note 10, at 32–33.  For an overview of the importance of 
guilds, see Christine Moll-Murata, Chinese Guilds from the Seventeenth to Twentieth 
Centuries: An Overview, in THE RETURN OF THE GUILDS at 213, 213–247 (Jan Lucassen,
Tine De Moor & Jan Luiten van Zanden eds., Int’l. Rev. of Soc. Hist. Ser. No. 16, 2008). 
223. The classic statement is HO PING-TI, THE LADDER OF SUCCESS IN IMPERIAL 
CHINA; ASPECTS OF SOCIAL MOBILITY, 1368–1911 (1962), which calculates the size of
the Song, Ming, and Qing bureaucracies in comparison to their respective populations. 
The book’s definition of “social mobility” has been controversial.  See the literature 
review at F.W. MOTE, IMPERIAL CHINA 900–1600, at 126–34 (2003), and BENJAMIN
ELMAN, A CULTURAL HISTORY OF CIVIL EXAMINATIONS IN LATE IMPERIAL CHINA 647–50, 
656, 659 (2000), which revises a number of Ho’s claims on social mobility, but largely
confirms his estimates on the overall size of the bureaucracy. For data on population
growth, see discussion at supra note 145. 
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C. Local-Level Adjudication 
Central regulations possess limited judicial significance until they are 
actually enforced through the official resolution of relevant disputes. 
Since the Qing Code expressly discouraged the appeal of commonplace 
“residency, marriage, or land” (huhun tiantu) disputes, the great majority 
of such disputes were handled only by county magistrates.224  Whether  
central regulations on conditional sales redemption could indeed supplant
contradictory local customs largely depended, therefore, on the adjudicatory 
behavior of these entry-level officials.  Here, however, it becomes much
harder to pinpoint relevant original sources. Adjudication is, naturally, 
best studied through case records, which generally fall into one of three 
categories: first, serious criminal cases compiled by provincial governments 
or the imperial court;225 second, privately written casebooks, usually 
compiled by retired officials based on their personal adjudication
experience;226 and third, local county archives such as the famous Baxian, 
Baodi, and Danxin collections.227 
Of these three, the second category is the least useful for our present 
purposes. Private collections generally only incorporate cases that, in 
the editor’s judgment, possess significant explanatory force or set good 
examples for future adjudication.228  As such, they have a strong tendency
to favor technically difficult or morally educational cases over “mundane,” 
commonplace ones, which explains why cases focusing on redemption 
or additional payment rights almost never make it into these compilations. 
This Article uses these compilations only in a complementary role.
The first category—central and provincial level criminal adjudication 
records—offers little reliable information on the local adjudication of 
land disputes.  Since imperial law strongly discouraged the appeal of
huhun tiantu cases to the provincial level unless a strong criminal
 224. DQLL, supra note 202, at 334.05. 
225. See XINGKE TIBEN (TUDI ZHAIWU LEI); XING’AN HUILAN. For books utilizing
these sources, see BUOYE, supra note 159; DERK BODDE & CLARENCE MORRIS, LAW IN 
IMPERIAL CHINA (1967).
226. E.g., QIU HUANG, FUPAN LUCUN, in 1 MING QING FAZHI SHILIAO JIKAN 371 
(Nat’l Library of China ed., 2008); FAN ZENGXIANG, FANSHAN PIPAN (Shanghai Guangyi 
Bookstore ed., 1915); DONG FEI, RUDONG PANYU. 
227. Historians have recently discovered a fourth in Nanbu county.  Yasuhiko 
Karasawa, Bradly W. Reed, & Matthew H. Sommer, Qing County Archives in Sichuan: 
An Update from the Field, 26 LATE IMPERIAL CHINA 114 (2005). It remains relatively
unknown in Western academia. Mainland Chinese scholars have fared better.  See  LI 
ZAN, WAN QING ZHOUXIAN SUSONG ZHONG DE SHENDUAN WENTI (2010) (utilizing the
Nanbu archives).
228. See, e.g., QIU, supra note 226, at 375–77. 
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element was present,229 provincial and central adjudication focused almost
exclusively on serious crimes.  The largest category actually seemed to be
homicide.230  More problematically, Qing law explicitly separated huhun 
tiantu disputes from more serious cases not only in the availability of 
appeal, but also in the level of discretion that local magistrates enjoyed. 
For example, a magistrate could diverge from the prescribed punishments 
in the Qing Code for huhun tiantu cases.231  Thus, instead of receiving a
physical beating, the losing side would generally pay damages or obey a 
court injunction.232  More importantly, the magistrate could allow huhun 
tiantu cases, but not serious criminal charges, to end in informal
mediation.233 We cannot project the adjudication patterns found in
provincial homicide cases onto the processing of ordinary civil cases.
This is especially true of cases where sharp differences existed between 
local custom and formal law.  In such situations, the magistrate had good 
reason to be cautious: enforcing formal law could frequently trigger enough 
discontent to damage his personal reputation and local standing, if not 
outright threaten his personal safety.234  Assuming that his decision would 
probably be unappealable, the prudent move would be to allow mediation,
and thus avoid enforcing a potentially unpopular law.  As we will see 
shortly, this is exactly what happened in most county archive cases. 
This leaves us with the third category: county-level case archives. 
There are, as noted above, three major archives that have been employed
in legal history research since the 1980s.  Combined, these archives offer
detailed case records of several hundred civil disputes, ranging from the 
late-Qianlong era to the early Republican years.235  The archives preserved a
significant percentage of the county’s actual caseload, with no obvious
229. See Jonathan Ocko, I’ll Take It All the Way to Beijing: Capital Appeals in the
Qing, 47 J. ASIAN STUD. 291, 295 (1988) (“[N]o appeals of minor civil cases . . . could
be accepted.”); Qiang Fang, Hot Potatoes: Chinese Complaint Systems from Early Times 
to the Late Qing, 68 J. ASIAN STUD. 1105, 1121 (2009) (noting that huhun tiantu cases 
could not be appealed beyond the prefecture level). 
230. BUOYE, supra note 159, at 1–16. 
231. LIBU CHUFEN ZELI, cited in ZHONGGUO FAZHI TONGSHI, supra note 214, at 
676–77. 
232. Mark Allee, Code Culture, and Custom: Foundations of Civil Case Verdicts in 
a Nineteenth-Century County Court, in CIVIL LAW IN QING AND REPUBLICAN CHINA, 
supra note 213, at 122, 126–27. 
233. PHILIP C.C. HUANG, CIVIL JUSTICE IN CHINA: REPRESENTATION AND PRACTICE 
IN THE QING 119 (1996).
234. See discussion supra notes 221, 222. 
235. HUANG, supra note 233, at 239–40. 
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sign of institutional or personal filtering.  What they offer, then, is an
opportunity to observe local-level adjudication in its original colors.  For 
our present purposes, these cases are especially valuable because they 
occurred after both the Qing Code revisions discussed above and the 
issuance of the Board of Finance Regulations, and therefore provide 
information on their enforcement.
We focus here on twenty-seven civil disputes related to conditional sales, 
of which twenty-six are randomly drawn from county case archives.236 
Within these twenty-seven, only nine reached a formal court decision, while
the other eighteen ended through some out-of-court process, usually 
community mediation.237  A cursory glance at this ratio suggests a clear 
willingness on the magistrate’s behalf to allow mediation.  More importantly, 
the nine formally adjudicated cases were mostly “easy cases” that did
not involve the more provocative rules in either the Qing Code or the 
Board of Finance Regulations.  In particular, none involved the issue of 
redemption deadlines.  Two examples will suffice to illustrate this. In the 
first, the Baxian county government had sold land confiscated from a 
temple, which was engaged in illegal activities.238  That land, however,
had previously been conditionally sold to several parties, who now 
petitioned for repayment.  The magistrates determined that they had no 
relation to the temple’s crimes and arranged compensation.  This case
does not, in fact, involve any legal rule discussed above, but was morally 
straightforward. The second case involved a peasant who had conditionally 
sold land to another,239 but had later made the sale irrevocable and had
received the additional payment.  A few years afterwards, he attempted
to reclaim the land by cutting down its trees for sale.  The magistrate
found for the new owner, and no other result was possible unless he
assumed that irrevocable sales could be redeemed.240 
236. Baodi Archives [hereinafter Baodi] 194, 1839.2.23; Baodi 96, 1846.95.8; 
Baodi 96, 1846.100.6; Baodi 103, 1863.117.27; Baodi 104, 1865.5.22; Baodi 109, 
1870.22.8; Baxian Archives [hereinafter Baxian] 6:1:722, 1770.7; Baxian 6:1:739, 
1774.8; Baxian 6.1:746, 1775.3; Baxian 6.1:749, 1775.10; Baxian 6:1:761, 1777.3; 
Baxian 6:2:1413, 1796.11; Baxian 6:2:1415, 1797.1; Baxian 6.2.1418, 1797.3; Baxian, 
6:2:1416, 1797.6; Baxian 6:2:1427, 1797.6; Baxian 6.2:1428, 1797.8; Baxian 6.2:1430, 
1797.8; Baxian 6:2:1421, 1807.4; Baxian 6.4:1707, 1851.8; Danxin Archives 
[hereinafter Danxin] 23201, 1868.10.23; Danxin 23202, 1873.10.18; Danxin 23205, 
1879.2.18; Danxin 23206, 1879.11.6; Danxin 23208, 1881.11.21; Danxin 23209, 
1882.3.8; Shen Yanqing, Huaiqing Yigao, in 1 JINDAI ZHONGGUO SHILIAO CONGKAN
525–27 (Shen Yunlong ed., Taibei, Ser. No. 0378, 1966). 
237. For the nine formally adjudicated civil disputes, see Baodi 103, 1863.117.27; 
Baodi 96, 1846.95.8; Baodi 194, 1839.2.23; Baxian 6:1:722, 1770.7; Baxian 6:2:1413, 
1796.11; Baxian 6:2:1415, 1797.1; Baxian, 6:2:1416, 1797.6; Danxin 23206, 1879.11.6; 
Danxin 23209, 1882.3.8.
 238. Baxian 6:1:722. 
239. Baxian 6:2:1415, 1797.1. 
240. See also Danxin 23209, 1882.3.8; Baodi 194, 1839.2.23. 
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More interestingly, one case actually saw the magistrate explicitly
disobey a Qing Code statute.  In a late-eighteenth century Baxian case,
Yang Panlong had conditionally purchased a piece of land from Liu
Hongzhi.241  Some time later, he asked Liu to redeem it.  Liu agreed, but
also wanted to sell it outright to a third-party.  He therefore proposed to
pay his debt to Yang through the revenue from that third-party sale.
Yang disagreed and brought the case to court, where the magistrate
ordered Liu to proceed with his sale and pay Yang afterwards. This
clearly contradicted Statute 95 of the Code, which, as noted above,242 
stated that no land under a conditional sale contract could be sold unless 
the seller first redeemed it in full. 
On the other hand, no case that potentially involved the mandatory
eleven-year redemption deadline ever reached a formal court decision. 
They were instead mediated out-of-court.  These account for nine of the 
eighteen un-adjudicated cases, most involving an outright attempt to
redeem, others involving a conditional seller claiming “sharecropping 
rights” over the transacted land, but all seeing at least eleven years pass 
between the original transaction and the suit.243 Several of these 
involved attempts to redeem contracts made many decades ago.  In an
1865 Baodi case, for example, Zhao Yong sought to redeem land that his 
great-grandfather conditionally sold in 1788.244  When the conditional
buyer’s descendant refused, Zhao cut down his wheat.  While this would 
have been a clear-cut decision for the current owner if the magistrate
enforced the Board of Finance Regulations, he allowed it to end in
mediation, where, as discussed below, the mediator apparently recognized
Zhao’s claim to the land.  A Danxin magistrate in charge of a similar
241. Baxian 6:2:1413, 1796.11. 
242. See DQLL, supra note 202. 
243. Baodi 104, 1865.5.22; Danxin 23208, 1881.11.21; Baxian 6:2:1418, 1797.3; 
Yanqing, supra note 235; Baxian 6:1:761, 1777.3; Baxian 6:2:1430, 1797.8; Danxin 
23201, 1868.10.23; Danxin 23202, 1873.10.18; Danxin 23205, 1879.2.18.  All of these
involve conditional sellers claiming an ownership stake in the transacted land at least ten
years after the original transaction.  Apart from these nine redemption-related cases, the
other nine un-adjudicated cases are Baodi 109, 1870.22.8 (involving a price-dispute over 
the added value to a piece of conditionally sold land); Baodi 96, 1846.100.6 (involving a 
sharecropping agreement over a piece of conditionally sold land); Baxian 6.4:1707, 
1851.8 (involving ownership of an ancestral gravesite on a transacted property); Baxian
6:1:739, 1774.8 (likewise); Baxian 6:2:1421, 1807.4 (likewise); Baxian 6:2:1427, 1797.6 
(likewise); Baxian 6.1:749, 1775.10 (conditionally selling the same piece of land
multiple times); Baxian 6.2:1428, 1797.8 (likewise); Baxian 6.1:746, 1775.3 (likewise). 
244. Baodi 104, 1865.5.22.
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1881 case, involving a conditional sale from 1835, actually went beyond 
this.245  While he did not formally issue a decision, he told the grand-
nephew of the original seller: “the land was conditionally sold by your 
granduncle to Su Gong . . . .  How can his grandson Su Li refuse to allow
redemption?”246  This magistrate clearly ignored the eleven-year limit on 
redemption. 
Some cases also involved additional payment claims on top of the 
redemption attempts.  In another 1797 Baxian case, two brothers attempted 
to squeeze further additional payments out of their grandfather’s conditional 
sale contract, even though it had become legally irrevocable over thirty
years ago due to the grandfather’s acceptance of an additional payment.247 
They returned to the land and, using a familiar tactic, cut down its bamboo, 
stating that their ownership interests had yet to terminate, and that they
were reclaiming their rights.  This case also went to mediation, but the 
case record does not document the mediation result.  The other six cases
involving contested redemption offer basically similar fact patterns to
the three described above.248 
The general tendencies of local magistrates are fairly apparent. They 
tended to leave conditional sales disputes, especially ones that involved 
prolonged redemption rights, to mediation, and usually declined to enforce 
potentially controversial regulations.  While most cases that did reach a 
formal decision adhered to the published law—a conclusion reached by
several previous studies,249 a few did not.  In some mediated cases, the
magistrate expressly indicated his disagreement with central regulations.
All in all, enforcement of central-level laws and regulations was weak. 
To scholars familiar with the existing historiography on Qing local 
government, these conclusions are unsurprising.  The structural peculiarities
of Qing county bureaucracies are well known.  In a system where, as 
discussed above, county magistrates had a very limited staff and few
personal acquaintances in the local community, they hardly had the tools 
to effectively combat local interest groups or custom.250  Nor would they
have much incentive to.  As noted before, most land-related cases were
relatively non-appealable, so deference to local custom would rarely
cause any problem with their superiors.  The fact that their administrative 
245. Danxin 23208, 1881.11.21. 
246. Id.
247. Baxian 6:2:1418, 1797.3. 
248. Shen, supra note 236; Baxian 6:1:761, 1777.3; Baxian 6:2:1430, 1797.8; 
Danxin 23201, 1868.10.23; Danxin 23202, 1873.10.18; Danxin 23205, 1879.2.18.
 249. HUANG, supra note 233, at 17; Buoye, supra note 198, at 99–100.  These 
conclusions do not contradict our conclusions here, which simply argue that difficult 
cases involving a law-custom split were usually left to mediation—the magistrate was 
not violating any legal rule by allowing this. 
250. See discussion supra pp. 158, 160. 
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organization was staffed by locals with deep social connections only
increased their reliance on local goodwill.251 
Of course, the mere fact that magistrates tended to leave conditional 
sales disputes to informal mediation does not necessarily mean that the
mediations followed local custom, rather than formal law.  Of our nine 
mediated disputes that potentially involved the ten-year deadline, only 
three suggest how the mediation proceedings eventually concluded. 
This is too small a sample to generate concrete conclusions on its own, 
but can nonetheless offer interesting insights when read together with the
custom surveys examined in Section IV.A. Moreover, since existing
mediation documents are extremely rare, one must make the best of what
is available.
Two such cases have appeared above.  The first is the 1881 Danxin 
case involving a conditional sale from 1835.252  As noted, the magistrate 
issued no verdict, but did observe to the grand-nephew that “the land
was conditionally sold by your granduncle to Su Gong . . . .  How can
his grandson Su Li refuse to allow redemption?”253  The case record then
indicates that the dispute was eventually resolved through mediation. 
This strongly suggests that the final mediation result allowed redemption, 
although potentially with some financial concessions to the buyer’s
grandson. Since the magistrate’s comment was a clear violation of
the Board of Finance Regulations, the motivation for his comments lay 
elsewhere, either in his personal sense of equity or a prudent deference 
to local custom. The latter motivation works well, of course, for our
argument that dian redemption customs were socially influential, but if
extended redemption rights were actually part of the magistrate’s personal 
sense of equity, then perhaps we have underestimated the social importance
of permanent landownership ideals. 
The other case, the Zhao Yong incident from Baodi, had a very similar 
fact pattern. The record shows that communal mediators took control 
and reached a settlement: the original seller’s great-grandson, who had
cut down wheat from the contracted land, could keep the crops, but
would also allow the original buyer’s family to keep using the land.254 
The original contract would not, however, be replaced by an irrevocable 
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original contract was over eighty years old, so any acknowledgement of 
the great-grandson’s claim would suggest that the mediators did indeed 
consider his right of redemption was still valid.  As with all individual
mediation results, we cannot be sure whether the mediators were
consciously following local custom or just trying to make both sides
happy.  As argued in Section IV.A., however, local customs in North China,
where Baodi is located, did support indefinite redeemability vigorously. 
The concurrence between these customs and the specific outcome in this 
case is at least suggestive. 
The third case is perhaps the most interesting—it is the only case in
our sample that was not drawn from a county archive, but is nonetheless 
included here due to its fascinating fact-pattern.  This was an early
nineteenth century case from Jiangxi, found in a magistrate’s private 
case collection. It involved an old man attempting to redeem land that 
he had sold to his neighbor forty years ago.255  The old man claimed that 
the sale was conditional, but the magistrate found that it had actually 
become irrevocable some years ago.  In any case, the eleven-year
redemption window had long expired for this Jiangxi transaction, and the
old man would have had no legal right to redeem even if the contract
were still conditional.  Here, however, the magistrate expressed sympathy 
with the old man’s economic plight and informally persuaded the neighbor
to allow redemption.  Consciously avoiding formal law, he instead favored 
an out-of-court settlement that agreed with local customs.
Ultimately, what limited information we have on mediation results 
does indeed show that they tended to agree with local custom, perhaps
with the magistrate’s active encouragement.  Moreover, the very fact 
that most local conditional sales customs continued to contradict official
law well into the early-twentieth century already constitutes fairly convincing 
proof that local enforcement of the ten-year regulatory deadline was
weak. One particularly interesting development in the 1929 Republican 
Civil Code was that it extended the mandatory redemption deadline for 
conditional sales from eleven years—the Qing rule—to thirty, even
though rural commercialization had increased drastically since the mid-
Qing.256 Republican lawmakers might have realized that the ten-year
deadline was simply unenforceable, and therefore made a concession to 
local customs.257  Shielded from formal legal pressure by the passiveness
 255. Shen, supra note 236. 
256. ZHONGHUA MINGUO MINFA DIAN [CIVIL CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA],
arts. 912, 924 (1929). 
257. Philip Huang has interpreted this as a partial rethinking of the “pre-
commercial” logic of rural society. HUANG, supra note 124, at 88–89.  As noted above, 
however, Huang did not seem to be aware of the ten-year rule in the Hubu Zeli, and 
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of county magistrates, these customs regulated conditional sales in most 
of China’s economic and cultural “core,” creating a widespread normative
presumption in favor of indefinite redeemability. 
V. COMPARISON WITH ENGLISH LAND TRANSACTIONS NORMS
How, then, do these transactional norms compare to English land 
transaction institutions? Ultimately, an explanation of the Sino-English 
divergence in capitalist agriculture must be an exercise in comparative
legal history.  The central issue is not, of course, what the term “conditional 
sale” means in English law, but whether we can find a functional
equivalent in sixteenth and seventeenth century English land transaction 
norms.  When the transition to managerial farms occurred did English
real property norms allow landholders to transact their land for a lump
sum—in essence, use land as security for a monetary loan—while
retaining indefinite rights of redemption at little or no interest?  We 
argue here that they did not.  English law and custom did recognize a 
right of redemption for certain transactions, but such rights were only
secure for relatively short periods of time.  For example, local customs
often mandated a one-year redemption period for mortgages.  Thus,
redemption windows were generally quite limited and, moreover, were 
enforced with extraordinary rigor until the late seventeenth century.  This 
created a transaction system that was perhaps cleaner and less dispute-
prone than Qing conditional sales, but also much harsher on the conveyor.
One preliminary issue that haunts any study of English property rights 
is the status of copyhold land—land technically owned by the lord of the 
manor, but then rented out to tenants.  More precisely, were the rules for 
copyhold transaction substantively different from those governing the 
transaction of freehold land?  Fourteenth century copyholders were
transacting and conveying their land in roughly the same ways as a 
freehold tenant, and by the later sixteenth century any major normative 
difference on this issue had largely vanished.258  The main differences
therefore conceivably interpreted the Republican rule as less tolerant of redemption than
Qing laws.
258. See generally  ERIC KERRIDGE, AGRARIAN PROBLEMS IN THE SIXTEENTH
CENTURY AND AFTER 32–93 (1969) (arguing that, by the sixteenth century, copyhold and
freehold were effectively equivalent for most legal questions); J.H. BAKER, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 348–50 (3d ed. 1990); S.F.C. MILSOM,
HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 165 (2d ed., 1981) (“[The] copyhold
[by the early Seventeenth Century] . . .  had equal protection . . . .”). 
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were that copyholds could only change hands through a “surrender and 
admittance” in the lord’s court, but this was predominantly a formality.259 
Otherwise, copyhold conveyances employed conditions, limitations,
remainders, trusts and mortgages just like freeholds.260  These were
nominally governed by local customs, but the distinction between custom 
and law on these issues had begun to blur as early as the fourteenth century, 
when royal courts began to enforce “reasonable” customs,261 and had 
certainly become rather insignificant in our era of interest (ca. 1500– 
1700).  Courts of equity had recognized copyhold claims well before the 
reign of Henry VIII, and, by at least the sixteenth century, even the 
sluggish common law courts had caught up, applying common law rules 
to copyholds via writs of trespass.262 
Moreover, common law rules on real property had possessed deep 
customary roots ever since their creation in the twelfth century.  Instead
of imposing a foreign system, they generally attempted to reinforce
manorial custom, which was actually quite uniform across different
geographical regions.263  While custom differed from the common law in 
issues such as fines and services to the lord, it recognized the same 
modes of transaction and applied similar rules.264  Indeed, when legal 
treatises discussed the rules of medieval land conveyance, they drew 
freely from customary sources.265  Although the distinction between
copyhold and freehold was undoubtedly important in some circumstances 
—when, for example, the copyholder wished to sue his lord—it did not 
259. See, e.g., WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
371 (Univ. of Chicago Press 1979) (1776); A.W.B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE LAND 
LAW 170 (2d ed., 1986). 
260. See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 258, at 350 (discussing conditional and limited
remainders in copyhold); SIMPSON, supra note 259 (“[Mortgages] could be used for both 
freehold and leasehold property . . . .”); University of Nottingham, Copyhold Land, 
http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/manuscriptsandspecialcollections/researchguidance/deedsi
ndepth/copyhold/copyhold.aspx (last visited May 6, 2009) (noting that copyholds could
be “bought and sold, inherited by descendents, left in a will, mortgaged, and settled, just 
like freehold estates.”). 
261. Albert Kiralfy, Custom in Mediaeval English Law, 9 J. LEGAL HIST. 26, 28–30, 
32–33 (1988).
262. WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, 7 A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 306 (2d ed., 1937)
(“[T]he grants made by the copyholder were subject to the ordinary rules of law.”); 
CHARLES MONTGOMERY GRAY, COPYHOLD, EQUITY, AND THE COMMON LAW 23–34, 54– 
66 (1963).
263. S.F.C. MILSOM, THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF ENGLISH FEUDALISM (1976);
Kiralfy, supra note 261, at 28–29 (“In principle the custom of each manor was separate, 
but obviously the basic principles would be similar though adapted to local geography
and conditions.”). 
264. ALAN HARDING, A SOCIAL HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 95 (1966).
265. See, e.g., BLACKSTONE, supra note 259, at 156 n.q.; HENRY DE BRACTON, 2 DE 
LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS ANGLIAE 69 (Samuel Thorne trans., 1970), available at
http://hlsl5.law.harvard.edu/bracton/ (discussing the law of lay assizes).
176
ZHANG (DO NOT DELETE) 1/31/2012 9:28 AM     
 



























[VOL. 13:  129, 2011] Property Rights 
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.
seem to substantively affect the basic rules and categories of conveyance 
by the sixteenth century.266  Since this Article examines both legal and 
customary norms, there is little need to maintain a rigid separation of
copyhold and freehold tenure throughout the following analysis. 
Section V.A surveys the main categories of revertible land transactions— 
fees “upon condition” and “upon limitation,” and considers their 
comparability with Chinese conditional sales.  Section V.B hones in on
the most comparable subcategory, mortgages, and carefully examines
the legal and customary regimes that regulated mortgage redemption.
Section V.C then examines some statutory transactions that bear some
resemblance to conditional sales.
A. Narrowing the Range of Inquiry
To students of modern Anglo-American law, the default example of a 
land transaction that allows redemption is, of course, the mortgage.  In
the “classic” English mortgage, which existed from the fifteenth century
to the early twentieth century,267 the mortgagor conveyed ownership
rights to the mortgagee, but retained rights of redemption until a fixed
date.268  Other forms of “mortgages” or “gages” had been in use since
Anglo-Saxon times, but followed similar principles.  Much of the following 
discussion will, therefore, compare English mortgages to Chinese
conditional sales. 
A preliminary question to consider is, however, whether to focus 
exclusively on mortgages.  In English legal history, the idea that a landed
estate could be cut short and “revert” back to the original conveyor was 
certainly not exclusive to mortgages.  As early as Bracton’s time, a
conveyance could be “conditional,” the conveyor would have a reversion
if some specified condition—generally if the receiver failed to have heirs
of his body—was satisfied.269  By Blackstone’s time, jurists had broken
down such transactions into further subcategories: a conditional conveyance
266. See KERRIDGE, supra note 258. 
267. The “classic” mortgage was prevalent by the fifteenth century. See  THOMAS 
DE LITTLETON, LITTLETON’S TENURES IN ENGLISH § 332 (Eugene Wambaugh ed., 1903).
This mortgage remained largely predominant until 1925 with the passing of the Law of 
Property Act.  Law of Property Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 20 (Eng.), available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1925/20/pdfs/ukpga_19250020_en.pdf. 
268. BLACKSTONE, supra note 259, at 155. 
269. BRACTON, supra note 265, at 71–83. 
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could either be “upon condition” or “upon limitation.”270  The former
gives the conditional conveyor an option of retrieving the property,
while the latter simply returns ownership automatically. 
The “classic” English mortgage outlined above was “subject to a
condition”: the mortgagor could choose to terminate the mortgagee’s
ownership upon timely payment of debt.271  The condition for reversion
here was, of course, timely repayment.  The question we must ask, however, 
is whether all conveyances that could revert after repayment—in other
words, allowed redemption—were necessarily mortgages.  If not, then 
we cannot limit our inquiry to mortgages.  A deeper look into the medieval 
roots and definition of mortgages suggests, however, that such concerns 
are largely unnecessary.
In their earliest form, mortgages were not conditional conveyances at
all. The term “conveyance” implies that some transfer of formal title, 
whether in fee simple, for a term of years, for life, or via lease, has occurred, 
but in Glanvill’s time (circa 1180) no such transfer accompanied the
establishment of a “gage”—broadly defined as a landed security for 
debt.272  Instead, the “gagor” simply put the “gagee” in possession of the
transacted land without giving him any formal right to it.273  Glanvill 
separated gages into “living gages” (vivum vadium) and “dead gages”
(mortuum vadium, or “mortgages”).  In “living gages,” the transacted land’s 
annual yield counted towards the gagor’s debt as long as the gagee was 
in possession, whereas in “dead gages” it did not.274 
The problem with these antique gages is, naturally, the gagee’s lack of 
either legal or customary title.  Judges in both royal and local courts
found it difficult to determine to what, exactly, the gagee was entitled.275 
Theoretically speaking, he had no legal claim to the gaged land, and was 
only entitled to recover his debt.276  In practice, however, the judges
were often unable to compel monetary repayment, and thus could only
offer relief through compelling formal and permanent conveyance.277 
How they justified such conveyance remains somewhat ambiguous, but
later jurists correctly point out that they must have attempted to invent
 270. BLACKSTONE, supra note 259, at 154–55. 
271. FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, 2 THE HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 123 (1968); HOLDSWORTH, supra note
262, at 375. 
272. RANULF DE GLANVILL, TRACTATUS DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS REGNI
ANGLIAE X. 6–12 (G.D.G. Hall ed., 1965). 
273. Id. at x. 8. 
274. These concepts had Roman roots.  See H.W. Chaplin, The Story of Mortgage
Law, 4 HARV. L. REV. 1, 5–8 (1890). 
275. POLLOCK&MAITLAND, supra note 271, at 121. 
276. GLANVILL, supra note 272, at x. 11. 
277. POLLOCK&MAITLAND, supra note 271, at 121. 
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some kind of new and imaginary estate category to accommodate gages.278 
Not until the fifteenth century did the “classic” mortgage finally replace
these archaic forms.279  Since mortgages and conditional conveyances
had been quite unrelated up until this point, their legal merger required a 
number of conceptual modifications.  Mortgages were now conveyances 
of either full ownership or for a long term-of-years—generally over 100
years.280  These mortgages could be redeemed at any time prior to the
deadline, which was usually six months to a year after the initial 
transaction.281  In the latter case, the right of redemption did not
terminate upon the end of the term-of-years, but upon default of debt, 
which, of course, was not nearly as distant into the future.  Upon default,
either the full ownership would become free from future reversion, or the
long term-of-years would “swell” into full ownership.282 
On the other hand, the legal concept of conditional conveyance also
required tinkering so that it recognized a new kind of condition for 
reversion: that reversion would become possible upon repayment of 
debt, that is, upon redemption.  In Bracton’s time, conditional conveyances
consisted of three subcategories: those that depended “on the donee,” those
that depended on some third party, and those that were “fortuitous.”283 
Noticeably missing from this framework were conditional conveyances 
that reverted upon some action by the conveyor—redemption, for example.
Jurists needed, therefore, to expand the concept of “conditional conveyance”
before it could logically accommodate mortgages, and had largely
succeeded by Blackstone’s time.284  We must remember, however, that the
emergence of active redemption as a recognized legal condition directly
reflected the need to formalize mortgages.  It would be odd, therefore, if 
we could find a redeemable conditional conveyance that was somehow 
not a mortgage. 
278. Id.
 279. See discussion supra note 267. 
280. See Bamfield v. Bamford (1675), 73 PUBLICATIONS OF THE SELDEN SOCIETY
183; BLACKSTONE, supra note 259, at 157–58; SIMPSON, supra note 259, at 242–43. 
281. See discussion supra p. 161. 
282. See the discussion at LITTLETON, supra note 267, at §§ 216–18. 
283. BRACTON, supra note 265, at 71–72.  An example of a valid condition for
reversion would be if the “donee” (or conveyee) failed to possess “heirs of his body.” 
See POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 271, at 18.  Additionally, another valid condition
for reversion would be if he alienated his land to men of religion, or even if he alienated 
the land at all. See MILSOM, supra note 257, at 173–75. 
284. BLACKSTONE, supra note 259, at 155. 
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The definition of “mortgage” after the fifteenth century further confirms 
this impression.  A “mortgage,” whether at law or at custom, was simply 
“any arrangement whereby a loan was secured by a conveyance of real
property.”285  Because any redeemable conveyance of land was, theoretically,
a secured debt—and vice versa, the concept of “mortgage” was broad 
enough to incorporate all transactions that involved active redemption. 
The diverse legal forms that a mortgage could assume only emphasized
the broad scope of its basic concept.  A mortgage might well be a
conditional conveyance or a long term-of-years, but it did not necessarily
attach itself to any particular form of legal estate.  Instead, it embodied a
fundamental “intent”—to secure debt through conveyance of land—that
could take any one of several legal shapes.286  Indeed, we find this broad
definition of “mortgage” in fifteenth century legal authorities, and it 
remained predominant until at least the late nineteenth century,287 even
though mortgages had been firmly and almost exclusively bound to
conditional conveyances for centuries by then.  Finally, a basic survey of 
the main legal sources for the sixteenth and seventeenth century, including 
the English Law Reports and the Publications of the Selden Society, does 
not reveal any case or custom where a redeemable conditional conveyance,
whether “upon condition” or “upon limitation,” was classified as anything 
but a mortgage.288  All in all, the various developments and legal authorities
examined above strongly suggest that mortgages were the only recognized
instruments of transaction in common law, equity, or custom that contained 
an express right of redemption. 
B. Mortgages 
The issue, therefore, is whether English mortgages and Chinese
conditional sales were different enough to have affected the extent of 
managerial farming.  As should be apparent by now, the two had much
in common: they both involved the conveyance of land in exchange for a 
lump sum, and both imbue the conveyor with certain rights of redemption. 
285. BAKER, supra note 258, at 353.  For similar statements from earlier jurists, see 
Seton v. Slade, (1802) 32 Eng. Rep. 108 (Ch.); 7 Ves. 265; Mortgagees Legal Cost Act, 
1895, 58 & 59 Victoria c.25 (Eng.); and W.F. BEDDOES, A CONCISE TREATISE OF THE
LAW OF MORTGAGE 2–5 (2d ed. 1908). 
286. SIMPSON, supra note 259, at 242. 
287. See supra note 267. 
288. E.g., Manning v. Burges, (1663) 22 Eng. Rep. 678; 1 Ch. Ca. 29; Roscarrick v. 
Barton, (1672) 22 Eng. Rep. 769; 1 Ch. Ca. 216.  The customs are mainly found in 18 
PUBLICATIONS OF THE SELDEN SOCIETY (1904), and 21 PUBLICATIONS OF THE SELDEN
SOCIETY (1906). See especially Collier v. Walters (1873), L.R. 17 Eq. 252, which 
considered whether a determinable fee (a conditional conveyance upon limitation) that 
reverted upon repayment of debt was valid.  Judge Jessel determined that “there is not
any authority to be found” for any such limitation, and ruled it void. Id. at 261. 
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Of course, these are what make the two instruments comparable in the 
first place. Moving on to the details, however, we find differences of
varying importance. 
Those familiar with modern mortgages will probably notice rather 
obvious differences in the distribution of possession rights.  In modern 
English and American mortgages, the mortgagee generally does not 
possess the transacted land until default,289 whereas Chinese conditional
sales allowed the buyer to maintain possession until redemption. This
distinction, if true, would be economically significant.  A conditional
sales buyer who exercised his right of possession would, until conversion 
into an irrevocable sale, have little incentive to either improve the land 
or utilize it as a source of long-term capital.  A mortgagor who retained 
possession, however, could more or less control his own destiny, and 
would therefore have greater incentive to improve the land.
Unfortunately, this institutional difference only emerged in modern 
times. The basic theory of English mortgages underwent significant
revisions in the Law of Property Act 1925.290  This law attempted to fit
all mortgages into a uniform “lien theory,” giving the mortgagee a power 
of foreclosure upon default but refusing him pre-foreclosure possession.291 
In contrast, the classic English mortgage discussed above conveyed 
ownership rights to the mortgagee, whether for a long term-of-years or
for full ownership, and theoretically allowed the mortgagee to take
immediate possession unless the contract expressly covenanted otherwise.292 
Mortgagees would often decline possession in actual practice,293 but the
normative framework was no different from Chinese conditional sales.
It is true that late-seventeenth century courts began to actively discourage 
pre-foreclosure mortgagee possession,294 but the widespread creation of 
managerial farms had started much earlier. 
289. Lien theory mortgages, established in England by the Law of Property Act, 
1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c.20 (Eng.), give the mortgagee no title to the land until 
foreclosure.  For a brief summary of American mortgage law, see DAVID A. SCHMUDDE,
A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO MORTGAGES AND LIENS 7 (2004).
290. Law of Property Act 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c.20 (Eng.). 
291. Id.
 292. BLACKSTONE, supra note 259, at 158–59. 
293. Id. at 159. 
294. They did this by “calling the mortgagee very strictly to account, not only for
all rents and profits actually received, but for all rents and profits which ought with due
diligence to have been received.”  Bucks v. Gayer, (1684) 23 Eng. Rep. 453 (Ch.); 1
Vern. 258; Blacklock v. Barnes, (1725) 25 Eng. Rep. 218 (Ch.); Sel. Cas. T. King 53. 
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The primary institutional difference between Chinese conditional sales 
and English mortgages lies, ultimately, in the regulation of redemption 
deadlines and default.  Whereas conditional sales customs, as we
have emphasized above, usually guaranteed the seller an indefinitely
viable right of redemption, the notions of limited redeemability and 
default had been central to English mortgages since at least the fifteenth
century.  By the time Littleton wrote his treatise on tenures, he described 
mortgages as a conveyance “upon such condition, that if the [mortgagor]
pay to the [mortgagee] at a certain day, [for example], 40 l. of money,
that then the [mortgagor] may reenter.”295  This basic format remained
virtually unchanged for at least three centuries.  Thus, Blackstone could 
claim that a mortgage is where “a man borrows of another a specific 
sum . . . and grants him an estate in fee, on condition that if [he] 
shall repay the mortgagee the said sum . . . on a certain day mentioned 
in the deed, that then the mortgagor may [reclaim the land].”296 The
“living gage” that we discuss above does allow for the possibility of
indefinite redeemability, but it was an extremely archaic form that only 
Glanvill mentions.297 
We can assume, then, that early modern English mortgages generally 
—probably universally—carried deadlines for redemption.  There was
no law that prevented a mortgage contract from stating “this deed shall
be forever redeemable,” but no normative authority ever acknowledges 
this possibility.  Moreover, we know that sixteenth and seventeenth
century mortgages generally gave one-year redemption periods, with
few exceptions.  Collections of mortgage contracts at, for example, the
University of Nottingham demonstrate remarkable homogeneity in this 
regard.298  But what about contracts that, whether purposely or not,
failed to state an express deadline? By the nineteenth century, courts
would regularly apply default redemption deadlines in such cases: any 
use of the term “as mortgagor” would automatically imply a half-year
See also R.W. Turner, The English Mortgage of Land as a Security, 20 VA. L. REV. 729,
730 (1934).
295. LITTLETON, supra note 267 (emphasis added). 
296. BLACKSTONE, supra note 259, at 158 (emphasis added). 
297. See supra discussion surrounding note 273.  See, however, the discussion of
statutory transaction instruments in Part IV.C—some of these instruments resembled 
living gages in their mechanisms, but, as they were created by statute and largely limited 
to urban merchants, cannot be considered continuations. 
298. Mortgage by Demise, UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM, http://www.nottingham.ac. 
uk/manuscriptsandspecialcollections/researchguidance/deedsindepth/mortgaged/demise.
aspx (last visited Aug. 26, 2011) (“The date for repayment is usually given as one year 
from the date of the mortgage.”); Mortgage by Conveyance, UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM, 
http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/manuscriptsandspecialcollections/researchguidance/deedsi
ndepth/mortgaged/conveyance.aspx (last visited Aug. 26, 2011) (“The date for
repayment is usually given as one year from the date of the mortgage.”).
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redemption period unless expressly made otherwise.299  Scholars have
suggested that the rule had origins in the seventeenth century.300 
If we backtrack a little to the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries and 
search surviving customs records, we do indeed find numerous customs
that mandated one-year redemption periods.  For example, in the customs 
compilations of the Selden Society, many localities that have preserved 
their medieval mortgage customs report a mandatory one-year redemption 
period.301 There is, in fact, good reason to suspect that such customs
were quite prevalent throughout the late medieval and early modern
periods. The striking uniformity of sixteenth and seventeenth century 
mortgage contracts in this regard strongly suggest the existence of some
underlying normative force.  It would otherwise be very difficult to
understand why most contracts converged onto a one-year time frame, 
which, by this time, would be just as random as any other schedule.  All 
in all, the existing evidence strongly suggests that one-year redemption
periods had deep roots in historical practice, and that they were a common
customary norm in the early modern period.  It is hardly inconceivable
that increasing commercialization of land persuaded courts to shorten 
this norm to half-a-year by the nineteenth century. 
Redemption deadlines meant very little, of course, if courts refused to 
enforce them, but lack of enforcement was probably not an issue in pre-
eighteenth century England.  Common law courts, in particular, were
notoriously harsh in enforcing default provisions. As legal historians 
have long noticed, the date for repayment was strictly adhered to at
common law.302  Once it passed, the mortgagee would theoretically have
an absolute right of exclusion against the mortgagor, even if the amount 
of the loan were less than the land’s full market value.303  The harshness
of this rule is remarkable especially from a comparative perspective.  In
the event of permanent alienation, Chinese conditional sales customs 
299. Turner, supra note 294, at 736; see also BEDDOES, supra note 285, at 1.
300. Turner suggests that it may have originated in the later seventeenth or early
eighteenth century.  Turner, supra note 294, at 731. 
301. See the customs at 18 PUBLICATIONS OF THE SELDEN SOCIETY 143, 145, 147,
193 (1904). 
302. Wade’s Case, (1602) 77 Eng. Rep. 232 (C.P.); 5 Co. Rep. 114a; BLACKSTONE, 
supra note 259, at 158; BAKER, supra note 258, at 355; David Sugarman & Ronnie 
Warrington, Land law, citizenship, and the invention of “Englishness”: The Strange 
World of the Equity of Redemption, in EARLY MODERN CONCEPTIONS OF PROPERTY 111, 
113 (John Brewer & Susan Staves eds., 1995). 
303. See sources supra note 302. 
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would compel the buyer to provide the seller with “additional payments,” 
and thereby pay him the land’s full market value.304 
Until the late seventeenth century, however, the common law rule of 
strict default was undoubtedly the highest mortgage redemption norm in
England.  How frequently mortgagees actually utilized this rule is less 
clear. Many mortgagees were probably willing to grant repayment
extensions, if for no other reason than to accumulate more interest.305  On
the other hand, given the high level of concern over strict default in later 
seventeenth century equity courts,306 we can safely assume that a substantial 
number of mortgagees did successfully exercise these exclusion rights. 
Since this paper focuses on institutional comparisons, it focuses more
about whether people could exercise these rights than how many of them
actually chose to. 
Some local customs treated defaulting mortgagors more leniently than 
common law norms, but only marginally.  In the medieval customs of 
one Lancashire borough, for example, default did not give the mortgagee
an immediate right of possession, but rather a right of sale.307 A 
mortgagee must sell the land for its full value, take what is owed to him,
and return the rest to the mortgagor.  The rule did not, however, prohibit
the mortgagee himself from being the purchaser,308 and so he could
potentially pay the difference to the mortgagor and then assume full
ownership. For our purposes, however, whether the mortgagee himself
purchases the land is of little consequence.  The central point is that
default would lead swiftly to permanent alienation from the mortgagor, 
whether to the mortgagee or to some other buyer.  In the larger scheme
of things, this arrangement might actually have been more economically 
efficient than simply transferring ownership to the mortgagee. 
The customs of Romney, in Kent, were more complicated.309  The  
Selden Society records preserve two sets of customs for this locality, one 
from the mid-fourteenth century, the other from the late-fifteenth.
Mortgage redemption customs remained largely stable between these
eras.310  Once default occurred, the mortgagee would come to the local 
court and demand repayment.  The court would then publish this request 
for eight days and, should the mortgagor fail to redeem, convey full 
304. See discussion supra p. 151. 
305. For a survey of foreclosure and debt practices among high-income groups, see 
Christopher Clay, Property Settlements, Financial Provision for the Family, and Sale of 
Land by the Greater Landowners, 1660–1790, 21 J. BRIT. STUD. 18 (1981).
306. See discussion supra p. 172. 
307. 18 PUBLICATIONS OF THE SELDEN SOCIETY 143 (1904). 
308. Id.
 309. 18 PUBLICATIONS OF THE SELDEN SOCIETY 144–46. 
310. Id.
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ownership to the mortgagee.  If, however, the full value of the land
exceeded the mortgagor’s debt, the mortgagee would pay the difference.
Other mortgage redemption customs in the Selden Society records 
resemble one or both of the above.  They generally guaranteed mortgagors
the full value of their land, while also providing for permanent alienation — 
if the mortgagee demanded immediate satisfaction—within a few weeks
of default.311  By any measure, these customs were more accommodating 
to the mortgagor than the common law rule, but nonetheless gave the
redemption deadline significant normative weight.  Since, as mentioned
above, most customs also mandated “year-and-a-day” redemption periods, 
it was virtually impossible for English mortgages to mutate into the
century-long affairs that Chinese conditional sales frequently became,
unless it somehow made sense for the mortgagee.
Probably not until the later seventeenth century did any English court
substantially interfere with contractual redemption deadlines.  In 1654, 
the Court of Chancery outlined, for the first time, “the equity of
redemption.”312  By the mid-eighteenth century, there was a fixed format 
for this. As a matter of equity, default of payment gave the mortgagee 
not an absolute right of ownership, but only a right of foreclosure.  This 
meant an action of foreclosure in court, where the judge decided whether 
to compel immediate satisfaction or to extend the redemption period for 
a “reasonable time,”313 usually ranging from six months to two years.314 
Once the extension expired, the mortgagor could then obtain a decree of
absolute foreclosure. Alternatively, the mortgagee could exercise a
power of sale immediately after the first default, but could not purchase 
the land himself.315 
Despite the equity of redemption’s eventual legal importance, it has 
little significance for our present inquiry.  As noted above, English
agriculture had become largely managerial by 1700, meaning that tenant-
driven land accumulation took off well before that.  The equity of
redemption, however, was not firmly established until the eighteenth
311. Apart from the customs discussed above, see also 18 PUBLICATIONS OF THE
SELDEN SOCIETY 143–44, 147, 192–93, 289.  The longest extension is found on page 289, 
which gave roughly one month—between Michaelmas and All Saints Day.
312. Duchess of Hamilton v. Countess of Dirlton, (1654) 21 Eng. Rep. 539; 1 
Chancery Reports 165. 
313. Sugarman & Warrington, supra note 302, at 113; Sheldon Tefft, The Myth of 
Strict Foreclosure, 4 U. CHI. L. REV. 575, 576–78 (1937). 
314. Tefft, supra note 313. 
315. Id. at 580–81; BLACKSTONE, supra note 259, at 159. 
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century,316 and therefore had very little impact on the process of 
accumulation.  Although the first decision appeared in 1654, Chancery
was split for the rest of the seventeenth century, with Nottingham in
favor of equitable redemption and North against.  In, for example, the 1681
case of Newcombe v. Bonham, North refused to allow equitable redemption,
reversing Nottingham’s earlier decision and ordering immediate
alienation.317 Meanwhile, common law courts adhered to their strict
default rules until at least 1672.318  All in all, courts of equity played no 
significant role in easing mortgage redemption until well after the takeoff of
managerial farming.  Within our period of interest, common law and 
customary norms probably predominated and, as demonstrated above, 
usually provided for strictly enforced one-year redemption periods.
C. Other Transactional Instruments 
Apart from these more “organic” forms of land transaction, English
law also recognized a number of statutory transaction forms. These
were generally created by royal decree to meet certain economic needs. 
Two of these forms, the statute merchant and the statute staple,319 were
somewhat similar to mortgages.  They are “securities for debts . . . 
whereby the lands of the debtor are conveyed to the creditor, till out of
the rents and profits of them his debt may be satisfied: and during such
time . . . he is tenant by statute merchant or statute staple.”320  Unlike  
mortgages, these did not carry a fixed deadline for redemption.  They
were not, however, freely available to most landowners.  Since these 
instruments were created by statutory decree,321 the state maintained
tight control over their procedural application.  The transacting parties 
needed to appear before the mayor of an authorized “staple,” of which
there were only a few in England, and register their agreement.322 
Moreover, prior to 1532, they were only available to registered traders.323 
Finally, one can conceive of two legal fictions that might allow a 
landowner to “borrow” money via reversible conveyance of land, but 
avoid formal categorization as a mortgage.  The first would be a term-of-
years conveyance that was then rented back to the conveyor. For
316. E.g., Burgess v. Wheate, (1759) 96 Eng. Rep. 67; 1 Black. W. 123 (K.B.). 
317. Newcomb v. Bonham, (1681) 23 Eng. Rep. 266; 1 Vern 7 (Ch.).
318. Roscarrick v. Barton, (1672) 22 Eng. Rep. 769; 1 Ch. Cas. 216. 
319. BLACKSTONE, supra note 259, at 160; see also A.W.B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF
THE COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT: THE RISE OF ASSUMPSIT 87–88, 126–35 (1975). 
320. BLACKSTONE, supra note 259, at 160. 
321. The Statute of Merchants, 1285, 13 Edw. (Eng.); 1353, 27 Edw. 3 st. 2, c.9 
(Eng.).
322. BLACKSTONE, supra note 259, at 160. 
323. 1531, 23 Hen. 8 c.6 (Eng.).
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example, the conveyance would be for thirty years at £300, with yearly
rent set at £12. This effectively created a £300 loan, repayable in thirty
years with £60 of interest.  The potentially extended (but not indefinite) 
repayment schedule does resemble Qing conditional sales to a limited
extent, but the other aspects of this transaction are far more burdensome 
to the conveyor.  Without the purchaser’s consent, he could not regain 
ownership either sooner or later than the fixed term—if repayment could 
cut short the term-of-years, the transaction would become a mortgage 
and therefore subject to the same rules. A second option might be to 
“lease” land for a nominal rent, but require a large security deposit.  The
“landlord” could then regain possession via repayment of the deposit. 
Since, however, the “tenant” could terminate the lease at will, the “landlord”
would be under even greater pressure to repay than a usual mortgagor. 
In any case, as early modern legal treatises and cases contain very few, if
any, instances of these transactions, one may reasonably suspect that 
they had little socioeconomic importance. 
Ultimately, English law and custom do not seem to recognize any 
mode of land transaction that was both redeemable for indefinite periods 
and easily available to the general population.  To most landowners, the 
mortgage was probably the only practically accessible transaction that 
contained a right of redemption—but of a fundamentally different quality
than what we find in Chinese customs.  The difference between an
indefinitely viable right of redemption and a strictly-enforced deadline,
usually for a year, is simply enormous.  This, then, is the institutional
distinction we wish to draw between Chinese and English norms of land 
transaction. The remainder of this paper will consider its effects on land 
accumulation and the scale of agricultural production. 
VI. TESTING A NEW EXPLANATION
The institutional differences between Chinese conditional sales 
and English mortgages—more specifically, the difference between an
indefinite right of interest-free redemption and a one-year redemption
window—had enormous impact on patterns of land ownership and 
transaction. English norms were, first of all, much more likely to create
permanent alienation.  Scholars have persuasively demonstrated, in fact, 
that mortgage foreclosure and debt repayment accounted for enormous
amounts of permanent land acquisitions in sixteenth and seventeenth 
century England, usually by richer farmers from their less fortunate 
neighbors, and therefore in favor of managerial farming over the long 
 187
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run.324  The evidence from China, as discussed below, points in the
opposite direction.
Second, indefinite redeemability creates a highly different set of
incentives for landowners who need to sell land.  It allows landowners to
“sell” their land for a substantial sum without risking their permanent 
ownership, which intuitively made irrevocable sales both unnecessary
and suboptimal in most situations.  As a large number of social studies 
on both Qing and early modern English society have argued, the great 
majority of land-sellers, even those that were very wealthy, did so out of 
raw necessity, usually to meet an immediate expense or pay off a
pressing debt.325  Landowners in both societies were highly hesitant to
part with their property and, when forced to do so, generally hoped to
retain redemption rights for as long as possible.326  Thus, when given the
choice between a permanent transaction and an indefinitely redeemable 
“conditional sale” that did not accrue interest, we would expect a
significant majority to choose the latter, as long as it brought enough money 
to cover immediate needs.  In comparison, the English mortgagor who
had a year to redeem was in a much more perilous position, making the 
choice between a permanent transaction and a mortgage much less obvious. 
The general preference for conditional sales over permanent sales 
could, in fact, exist even in a society where most people used land as a
freely transact-able investment tool, and did not sell it merely to cover 
needs. As long as people anticipated rising land prices—certainly a 
valid assumption given increasing commercialization, land (not labor)
productivity and rent levels in most of the Qing and Republic327—a 
324. ALLEN, supra note 25, at 15; Clay, supra note 305.  C.f. Sugarman &
Warrington, supra note 302. 
325. For the Qing, see, e.g., HUANG (2001), supra note 124, at 73; HUANG (1990),
supra note 24, at 106; MACAULEY, supra note 158, at 230; Madeleine Zelin, The Rights
of Tenants in Mid-Qing Sichuan: A Study of Land-Related Lawsuits in the Baxian 
Archives, 45 J. ASIAN STUD. 499, 515 (1986).  Qing officials generally assumed that 
conditional sales were done out of a pressing and unavoidable need for cash. See Lin 
Qian & Zhang Jinfan, supra note 214, at part 3. For England, see Sugarman &
Warrington, supra note 302. 
326. This explains why social demand for the equity of redemption was so high in 
late-seventeenth century England. See Sugarman & Warrington, supra note 302. 
327. On the existence and growth of markets for agricultural produce throughout 
the early to mid-Qing, see supra note 11. After the mid-nineteenth century, exposure to 
foreign trade further boosted market integration levels.  See, e.g., THOMAS G. RAWSKI,
ECONOMIC GROWTH IN PREWAR CHINA (1989) (attributing early-twentieth century growth 
to market integration driven by the foreign presence); LILLIAN M. LI, CHINA’S SILK 
TRADE: TRADITIONAL INDUSTRY IN THE MODERN WORLD, 1842–1937 (1981) (positively
assessing the impact of foreign trade on silk production); ROBERT PAUL GARDELLA,
HARVESTING MOUNTAINS: FUJIAN AND THE CHINA TEA TRADE, 1757–1937 (1994)
(discussing the growth of the tea trade after the mid-Qing).  On growing land
productivity, see Philip C.C. Huang, Development or Involution in Eighteenth-Century 
Britain and China?, 61 J. ASIAN STUD. 501, 512 (2002) (arguing that land productivity
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conditional sale would allow the seller to wait for long-term value 
increases while still obtaining a substantial lump sum immediately.
There simply was very little downside in choosing a conditional sale 
over a permanent one.
This suggests the following explanation for China’s relative lack of
managerial farming: The availability of conditional sales in Chinese 
society made landowners less willing to engage in permanent transactions. 
Moreover, the eventual probability of permanent alienation in a conditional
sale was much lower than in an English mortgage.  Combined, these 
factors made permanent land accumulation difficult and slow—too slow,
in fact, for the widespread buildup of managerial farms.  If, however,
affluent peasants attempted to create managerial farms upon conditionally-
owned land, they would have had to shoulder the risk that land redemption, 
which was beyond their control, could swiftly lead to the farms’
disintegration. It was not, therefore, that managerial farms were harder 
to create in China, but rather that they fell apart more easily.  Over the 
long run, this prevented managerial farms from occupying a more
prominent place in Chinese agriculture. 
The prospect of redemption also might have impeded the creation of 
managerial farms by deterring capital investments in land. The
productivity advantage of at least some Qing managerial farms came 
from the fact that they could coordinate certain capital investments more
efficiently than household-size farms—Chinese agriculture may not have
been capital intensive, but it certainly was not capital free.  In particular,
irrigation, the use of roads, the creation of raised banks for fruit trees, 
and the long-term maintenance of fertilizer were all more efficient on
managerial farms.328  Other forms of long-term capital investment include
tools or animals that worked better on larger farms.329  Since these all 
involved making permanent or semi-permanent investments, farmers might
hesitate to pursue them on conditionally-held land that could be redeemed at
any time.  In fact, several scholars would argue that permanent capital
increased despite declining labor productivity).  On increasing pressure from landlords to
increase rent-levels throughout the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, see KATHRYN
BERNHARDT, RENTS, TAXES, AND PEASANT RESISTANCE: THE LOWER YANGTZE REGION,
1840–1950 (1992). 
328. For North China, see JING SU & LUO LUN, QINGDAI SHANDONG JINGYING 
DIZHU JINGJI YANJIU 130–41 (1984); HUANG (1985), supra note 11, at 139.  For the 
Lower Yangtze, see LI BOZHONG, supra note 11, at 62–68. 
329. Farm animals were indeed used more efficiently on larger farms. See discussion
supra p. 143. 
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investments were one of the main reasons why managerial farms enjoyed 
higher productivity, and therefore to remove them would be to lose the 
point of managerial farming.330  The validity of this argument depends
on whether these capital investments were cheap enough, relative to 
labor, to merit widespread use in Qing China. If they were, then it would 
indeed make little sense to create a managerial farm on conditionally-
held land. If they were not,331 then affluent peasants could conceivably 
choose to create a labor-intensive managerial farm through conditional 
purchases.  The problem there, as we have noted in the previous paragraph, 
would be that the purchases could be redeemed—and the farm
disintegrated. 
Under this latter scenario, we would expect to find that, first,
enterprising Chinese peasants who wished to purchase land usually had 
to rely on conditional sales; second, conditional sellers generally protected 
their redemption rights and rarely agreed to permanent alienation; and, 
third, obtaining permanent ownership of land was therefore highly 
difficult. This would be fundamentally different from the situation in
early modern England, where, as noted above, the combination of
irrevocable sales and fixed-term mortgages generated a steady stream of 
permanent conveyances from poor peasants into the hands of managerial
farmers.332 
The remainder of this article attempts to test these three hypotheses 
against economic data.  The second hypothesis has already been discussed 
in some detail above. The tension and drama contained even in our 
small sample of cases suggest, however crudely, that people took 
redemption rights seriously.  We do know that they fought over these 
rights so frequently—by some estimates, this one issue might have 
accounted for six percent of local civil litigation333—that the Qing Court
attempted to “reduce litigation” by imposing mandatory ten-year
deadlines.334  Its failure to do so only highlights the importance of dian
redemption to local communities. Quantitative data is rare, but what 
limited information we possess has led at least some scholars to argue 
that conditional sales were common, whereas permanent alienation of 
land was rare.335  For example, around 10% of arable land in a North
 330. JING & LUO, supra note 328, at 130–41; LI BOZHONG, supra note 11, at 62–68. 
331. A number of scholars have argued this point.  See supra note 104. 
332. See supra notes 128, 129, 324. 
333. WU, supra note 151, at 114.  Existing surveys of local gazetteers have likewise 
confirmed that sellers protected their customary redemption rights jealously, and that this 
was a frequent source of social negotiation and tension since at least the mid-Qing.
MACAULEY, supra note 158. 
334. See supra Part III.b. 
335. NAGANO, supra note 140, at 121–23. 
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China county was under conditional sale when Buck arrived with his 
survey team, while perhaps 5% of land in several Lower Yangtze counties 
permanently changed hands over a generation.336 This latter figure
includes not only land that became irrevocable after a conditional sale, 
but also outright permanent transactions. 
The first hypothesis is also easily confirmed.  Historians have known 
for some time that conditional sales were by far the most important
means of transacting land in Qing and Republican China.  The Japanese
survey data cited in the previous paragraph speaks clearly to this effect.
Moreover, virtually every scholar who has studied mainland Chinese 
contract archives confirms that conditional sales outnumber irrevocable
ones by a significant margin: Yang Guozhen and Cao Xingsui have done 
this for Fujian and the Lower Yangtze, while Philip Huang has made
similar claims about North China.337  As noted above, this makes good
sense if conditional sales usually generated enough money to cover 
immediate financial needs, which they probably did.  By most indications, 
conditional sales in North China commanded around 70% of the land’s 
full market value, while their counterparts in the Lower Yangtze and
South China could command up to 80%.338  For most landowners who
needed to finance an upcoming wedding, funeral, or some other
contingency, conditional sales probably met their needs just as well as a 
full-value but irrevocable sale.339 
336. Id.
 337. Yang, supra note 158, at 31; CAO XINGSUI, JIU ZHONGGUO SUNAN NONGJIA 
JINGJI YANJIU  31 (1996); HUANG (1990), supra note 24, at 106. 
338. HUANG (1985), supra note 11, at 176; McAleavy, supra note 154, at 406; 
MACAULEY, supra note 158, at 231. 
339. These studies of land contracts also provide information on the socioeconomic 
identity of conditional sellers and buyers.  The general impression is that poorer farmers 
sold land more frequently to make ends meet, but large landlords, too, conditionally sold
land with some frequency.  Loren Brandt & Barbara Sands, Land Concentration and
Income Distribution in Republican China, in  CHINESE HISTORY IN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE,
supra note 11, at 179, 185. On the purchaser side, the most active players seemed to
have been relatively well-off peasants who probably employed some wage labor.  We 
have, for example, relatively detailed survey information on transactions in Qingyuan
County, Hebei between 1934 and 1936. See Zhang Peigang, Qingyuan de Nongjia
Jingji, 7 SHEHUI KEXUE ZAZHI 1 (1936); Shi Zhihong, 20 Shiji San Sishi Niandai Huabei 
Pingyuan Nongcun de Tudi Fenpei ji Qi Bianhua, 3 ZHONGGUO JINGJISHI YANJIU 3 
(2002). Over 60% of buyers in these transactions were either “middle farmers” or “rich
farmers.” See Zhang Peigang, supra, at 8, 16, and data at Shi Zhihong, supra, at 5–6.
The survey suggests that “middle farmer” households tilled, on average, around 27 mu,
while the average “rich farmer” household managed around 90 mu.  Shi Zhihong, supra, 
at 5–6. Given that the average nineteenth century North China household could only
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This leaves the third hypothesis, that permanent land purchasing was
highly difficult.  In this particular aspect, our proposed explanation shares
considerable common ground with existing theories of Chinese land
inalienability, which, as discussed above, suggested that lineage first
purchase rights posed inefficient obstacles to free alienability.340  Their  
other empirical problems aside, they, too, sought to demonstrate that the 
market for permanent transactions was too small.  The actual volume of
permanent land transactions in any Chinese regional economy is, however, 
nearly impossible to estimate.  To make a reasonably useful calculation, 
we must measure both the size and the frequency of permanent transactions. 
Whereas we can find scattered local data on the former,341 the latter 
remains largely a mystery.  The Communist government did attempt to
measure the frequency of both conditional sales and permanent alienations
in Baoding between 1930 and 1957, but provides reliable statistical data 
for only one village: Gushang, in Qingyuan County.342 The frequency of
permanent alienations there fluctuated wildly between forty-four
transactions in 1935 to only eight in 1936.  The number of conditional 
sales is only measured for 1930 and 1936, but for both years they were 
nearly twice as high as permanent transactions.343  In any case, the small 
survey sample and the lack of statistical consistency make it impossible
to reliably project these figures onto even the provincial level.  Other
piecemeal Republican-era surveys suggest that, within the permanent
landholdings of an average Lower Yangtze household, only a miniscule 
percentage, perhaps 5%, had been bought instead of inherited.344  This  
would support our thesis very nicely, but once again, the limited reach of 
the surveys does not inspire confidence. 
Some scholars have attempted to compensate for the lack of frequency
figures by emphasizing that the vast majority of transactions were small.345 
This is undoubtedly true, but its usefulness is limited without reliable 
data on frequency.  Another issue is how to interpret the size of transactions. 
They were small in absolute terms, with a North China average of perhaps 5
farm 20–30 mu without outside help, see HUANG (1985), supra note 11, at 70, it would 
be unsurprising if most land-purchasing “middle farmers” and all “rich farmers”
employed some wage labor. 
340. See discussion supra pp. 147–48. 
341. See discussion infra note 345. 
342. Shi Zhihong, supra note 339, at 4, 14. 
343. Compare id. at tbl.19, with id. at tbl.22 (as Shi observes on p.14, data on land
transactions is only available for Gushang village.  We can assume, therefore, that the 
data in both table 19 and table 22 come from this one village).
344. NAGANO, supra note 140, at 122–23. 
345. See, e.g., MAZUMDAR, supra note 24, at 231–33. 
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mu (0.85 acres) and a Lower Yangtze average of 3 mu,346 but so was the
average Chinese farm.  If we remember that the great majority of North 
China farms were below 25 mu, and that most Lower Yangtze farms did
not exceed 10 mu, then these figures seem much more substantial.  All
in all, these figures mean very little until we have better evidence on who
sold how much at what frequency. This seems unlikely for the foreseeable 
future. 
If a direct measurement of transaction volume remains elusive for
now, is there any way to compensate?  One solution is to take a harder 
look at landholding patterns. If landowners purchased real property in
patterns that were clearly disadvantageous to them, then it seems reasonable
to assume that obtaining permanent rights to land was highly difficult,
and that the demand for permanent transactions often outpaced supply.
Somewhat predictably, we only have decent information on the landholding
patterns of large landlords, but these are nonetheless suggestive: Lower 
Yangtze landlords very rarely possessed large and contiguous tracts of
land, instead owning a large number of tiny patches dispersed over several 
counties. For example, a Guangxu era landlord in Yuanhe owned several 
hundred segregated plots in forty different polders, while a Pinghu 
landlord living in the later Qianlong era owned numerous unconnected 
parcels spread out over 60 percent of the county.347  Likewise, in 1903,
the Zhang family of Zhe County, Southern Anhui, owned sixty-three 
unconnected plots spread over ten different villages, none larger than 3 
mu.348 We can also measure this from a different angle—according to
Mantetsu surveys, over 80% of arable land in one 1940 Shanghai village 
was owned by eighty different outsiders, each possessing an average
346. In the Gushang survey, the average transaction between 1930 and 1936, before
the Japanese invasion triggered massive social upheaval, was around 5 mu.  Shi Zhihong, 
supra note 339, at 14. This seems to agree with other sources from North China, which 
all indicate that the vast majority of permanent transactions were between 1 and 10 mu.
6 IWANAMI SHOTEN, CHUGOKU NOSON KANKO CHOSA 406–20 (Committee for the 
Publication of the Rural Customs and Practices of China ed. 1958); JING & LUO, supra
note 328, at 65–68, 98–102.  Private contract collections from the Lower Yangtze
suggest that most permanent transactions were somewhat smaller, usually between 0.5 
and 5 mu. KATHRYN BERNHARDT, RENTS, TAXES, AND PEASANT RESISTANCE: THE
LOWER YANGTZE REGION, 1840–1950 17 (1992);  See also contracts from Anhui, 
Zhejiang and Jiangsu.  TIAN, supra note 185, at nos. 1–17, 19–21, 23–26, 99, 138, 239, 
240, 244, 275, 471, 506, 587, 928. 
347. BERNHARDT, supra note 346. 
348. TIAN, supra note 185, at no. 908.  See also supra note 345 (discussing how
Hong Ruoci’s 95 purchases can be separated into at least 17 unconnected plots, each no
larger than 7–8 mu). 
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of 6 mu.349  Small wonder, then, that large landowners in the Lower
Yangtze often became absentee landlords instead of managerial
farmers350—their land was so scattered that they had no choice. 
Tenancy was, of course, somewhat less prevalent in North China, but 
the existing data still suggests that large landlords in Hebei and Shandong 
rented out more land than they managed themselves: roughly 17% of 
total arable land fell into the former category, compared with 10-15% in 
the latter.351  Within this 17%, holdings were apparently just as scattered 
as they were in the Lower Yangtze.  The Meng family of Jiujun, for
example, rented out 600 mu to at least ninety tenant families, generally 
in separated plots spread across four or five villages.352 
It is hard to imagine why any landlord would have preferred to scatter 
his holdings to such an extent. It made rent collection and account 
keeping exceedingly difficult and, moreover, severely limited the landlord’s
economic flexibility: renting out large and consolidated bundles to rich
tenants, which would have provided greater rent security, was rarely
possible.  Some landlords may have wished to geographically diversify
their holdings to safeguard against natural disasters, but this hardly justifies
the extreme dispersion we find in both North China and the Lower
Yangtze. It might have made more sense to own medium-size parcels in
a handful of villages than to own one big plot, but further intra-village or
intra-polder separation into numerous tiny parcels probably provided no
additional ecological security. Most villages, especially in the Lower
Yangtze, were small and consolidated enough to ensure that its various 
segments experienced similar ecological conditions.353 
Chinese landowners were also notoriously unwilling to pay official
land and property taxes, so could the scattering of holdings simply have 
been a tax evasion technique?  Lower Yangtze landlords, in particular, 
were known for registering their holdings in hundreds of small parcels, 
each under a different name, to confuse tax collectors,354 but that hardly
justifies actually breaking up one’s holdings into hundreds of tiny,
unconnected plots—which is what we see here.  What really confuses
the tax collector is the registration of land under different names, but that 
can occur with or without actual segregation of land.  This latter action 
does very little to aid the former, and would simply add to logistical
349. This survey is described at HUANG (1990), supra note 24, at 107. 
350. See supra p. 146. 
351. The 17% figure is calculated based on Esherick, supra note 65, at 397.  The 
10–15% figure has been discussed above in the text surrounding notes 68–74. 
352. JING & LUO, supra note 328, at 98–102. 
353. See HUANG (1990), supra note 24, at 21–43. 
354. MADELEINE ZELIN, THE MAGISTRATE’S TAEL: RATIONALIZING FISCAL REFORM IN 
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY CH’ING CHINA 245 (1992). 
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confusion.  All things considered, the severe scattering of landlord property 
was probably not by choice, which suggests that even the largest
landlords found it highly difficult to permanently purchase real property.
Since the supply of permanent transactions was very low, potential 
purchasers could not afford to be as selective as they would have ideally
preferred. 
We have thus far confirmed, to the extent possible, all three hypotheses
laid out above, strongly suggesting that the existence of conditional sales 
was indeed a major limiting factor on the creation of managerial farms.
Compared to preexisting inalienability theories that emphasize lineage 
first-purchase rights, our proposed explanation highlights the different 
incentives in English and Chinese land markets, rather than the different
restrictions. Its empirical advantages should be fairly obvious by now, 
but one point deserves particular mention.  As discussed in Part Two,
Pomeranz has pointed out that labor input-per-mu figures in both North 
China and the Lower Yangtze were fairly consistent between and within 
different size-classes,355 which runs contrary to statistical projections
based on traditional inalienability theories.  General stability in labor input 
makes excellent sense, however, in our conditional sales-based explanation: 
relatively easy access to conditional sales meant that farmers could
efficiently adjust their landholdings to accommodate short-term fluctuations
in household labor supply—but also that, due to the interminability of
redemption rights, such adjustments often failed to accumulate over the 
long run.  Thus, labor input ratios could remain relatively stable even while
redemption activity kept the overall concentration of farmland at much
lower levels than we find in early modern England.
VII. CONCLUSION
This Article has argued for a property rights-based approach to the
Sino-English divergence in agricultural production.  Whereas harsh rules 
on mortgage redemption and conditional fee reversion facilitated the 
tenant-driven creation of managerial farms in sixteenth and seventeenth 
century England, the existence of infinitely redeemable conditional sales 
in Qing and Republican China diminished landowners’ incentive to 
permanently sell land and, thereby, obstructed the creation of managerial
farms.  The “problem” with Chinese property norms, therefore, was not
355. See discussion supra p. 148. 
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that it was too rigid, but rather that it was too flexible and accommodating 
towards sellers.  This may well have generated important benefits for
social stability and cohesion, but, over the long run, did lead Chinese 
agriculture onto a fundamentally different path than English agriculture. 
Logically speaking, this Article is only the start of a larger project. 
Whereas conditional sales were probably the institutional impetus that 
diverted Chinese agriculture away from managerial farming, the creation 
and social embracement of this institution suggest that deeper cultural 
currents were at work: Did Chinese society possess a stronger commitment
to permanent landownership than English society, or was it that English 
society valued free alienability and normative simplicity more highly?  If 
so, then why?  For now, at least, it makes sense to first clarify and organize 
our understanding of conditional sales and mortgages—they were, at
least, the institutional mechanisms that these cultural undercurrents operated 
through, but a thorough account of “the great agricultural divergence,”
if we may call it that, will eventually require further probing into these 
deeper socio-cultural issues. 
While there is clearly no space here to address these issues seriously, 
it may be worthwhile to throw out some hypotheses.  I suspect that the 
institutional distinctions between Chinese conditional sales and English 
mortgages had less to do with broad cultural perceptions and attitudes 
towards landed property than with the different allocations of social
status, prestige and power in Chinese and English rural communities.
Poorer households in Chinese localities enjoyed relatively greater social 
bargaining power than in England, and were better able to protect their 
socioeconomic interests in the creation and maintenance of local customs.
In the context of conditional sales, this meant giving stronger protection
to “sellers,” who were usually significantly poorer than “buyers,”356 by
granting them strong rights of redemption.  The balance of social power 
in English communities, on the other hand, favored wealthier households,
and therefore more often mortgagees than mortgagors. 
Chinese kin networks, I suspect, tended to allocate social authority 
based on kinship ties and seniority.  In crude terms, under a culture
influenced by Neo-Confucian ideals, people were encouraged to respect
the opinions and interests of relatives, more than those of non-relatives, 
and to respect elder relatives more than junior ones.  There were, of course, 
other important factors that influenced one’s status and reputation,
including wealth and political ties, but I suspect that they were unable to 
drown out the effect of kinship ties and seniority.  Moreover, kinship
closeness often did not correlate with economic similarity—Chinese kin 
356. See supra notes 324, 339. 
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networks were expansive, even in North China.357  Given that the economic
fortunes of the average household could fluctuate quite drastically within 
a generation or two,358 richer households usually had a fair number of
poor relatives.  The correlation between wealth and seniority is, of course, 
even weaker.  It was quite possible, therefore, to obtain decent status and
authority within certain circles even if one was poor—although, of course,
possessing wealth made it easier.
In comparison, while more recent scholarship has come to question the
usefulness of “class” in describing English social structures, preferring 
instead terms such as the “middling sort,” it nonetheless tends to agree 
that social status correlated rather strongly with wealth—even if wealth
was not the only, or even the dominant, determinant of status.359  Wealth 
was, at least, usually a necessary precondition of higher status and authority. 
In addition, most scholars now agree that early modern English 
communities rarely possessed powerful and expansive kin networks, and
that the individual household was the primary unit of social activity.360 
All in all, assuming that my hypothesis about the allocation of status and 
authority within Chinese kin networks is largely correct, poor Chinese 
rural households probably enjoyed substantively higher social bargaining
power than their English peers.  The fact that Chinese customs on
conditional sales redemption were more accommodating towards poorer 
households than English mortgage customs conceivably reflected this
bargaining power disparity.  These contentions are, of course, strictly 
hypothetical, but a detailed study of rural Chinese land disputes and
social structures will probably be able to verify them.
Further research on the institutional comparisons we examine here 
should be of interest not only to historians, but also to law and
economics theorists in general.  As noted in the Introduction, property
rights scholars have long debated whether local communities tend to
create economically efficient social norms. One influential argument is 
357. See Myron Cohen, Lineage Organization in North China, 49 J. OF ASIAN STUD.
509 (1990).
358. Lavely & Wong, supra note 140. 
359. See, e.g., KEITH WRIGHTSON, ENGLISH SOCIETY, 1580–1680, at 43 (2003); H.R.
French, Social Status, Localism and the ‘Middle Sort of People’ in England, 1620–1750, 
166 PAST AND PRESENT 66, 77–86, 93 (2000). 
360. H.R. French & Richard Hoyle, English Individualism Refuted and Reasserted:
the Case of Earls Colne (Essex), 1550–1750, 56 ECON. HIST. REV. 595, 595–96 (2003);
David Cressy, Kinship and Kin Interaction in Early Modern England, 113 PAST AND
PRESENT 38, 41 (1986). 
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that closely-knit communities will usually create economically efficient
norms through internal negotiation and communication.361  They achieve
this, Robert Ellickson argues, by developing a “market of norms.”  When a
community faces new socioeconomic conditions, community members 
with superior knowledge of cost-benefit conditions or internal communal 
dynamics will supply competing norm “candidates” to the entire group, 
from which the group then rationally chooses the most meritorious
norm.362  In contrast, other scholars have circulated more pessimistic
views of social norm creation, arguing that norms are not consistently 
created as thoughtful, measured responses to changing conditions, but
more often represent the equilibrium outcomes of selfish bargaining or 
signaling processes.363  There is, therefore, no guarantee that these outcomes 
will advance overall communal utility. 
The institutional and economic comparisons explored in this Article 
provide a historically significant case study for this debate.  Although
Chinese rural communities were probably no less closely-knit than
English ones—if not more so—due to the existence of powerful kin 
networks, the conditional sales customs they created had strongly 
negative economic consequences over the long run.  Ironically, the Qing
government’s attempts at imposing a ten-year deadline on conditional 
sales redemption, had they succeeded, would probably have given the 
creation of managerial farms a much-needed shot in the arm.  All this
seems to agree more with the pessimists than the optimists, but their full 
theoretical implications remain unclear until we study the norm creation 
mechanisms at work here in greater detail. 
Finally, this Article focused on the agricultural divergence between 
China and Western Europe, without fully addressing the general Sino-
English economic divergence, which covers a range of non-agricultural 
361. See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS
SETTLE DISPUTES 167 (1991); JAMES S. COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY 
249–58 (1990); Robert D. Cooter, Structural Adjudication and the New Law Merchant:
A Model of Decentralized Law, 14 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 215, 224–26 (1994). 
362. Robert C. Ellickson, The Market for Social Norms, 3 AM. LAW ECON. REV. 1
(2001).
363. ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2000); Eric A. Posner, Law,
Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1697 (1996); Richard H.
McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338
(1997). See also David Chamy, Illusions of Spontaneous Order: “Norms” in
Contractual Relationships, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1841, 1848 (1996) (arguing that norm-
making suffers from the same inefficiencies that plague legislation).  In fact, one can find 
the seeds of such pessimism as early as Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons,
162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968), and NORTH & THOMAS, supra note 3, which famously
considered pre-sixteenth century English commons to be economically inefficient and in 
need of state intervention to establish private property rights.
198
ZHANG (DO NOT DELETE) 1/31/2012 9:28 AM     
 





































[VOL. 13:  129, 2011] Property Rights 
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.
developments including industrial growth and trade.364  Managerial
farms did enjoy higher agricultural productivity, but, as noted in the
Introduction, whether this can explain Europe’s industrial and
manufacturing advantage remains a complex matter of great contention.
The precise scale and significance of the productivity boost is one issue, 
but one must also consider the effects of managerial farming on overall 
labor mobility, proto-industrial concentration of capital, and so on.365 
Limitations in length and time have prevented this article from tackling 
the full divergence question, but it is, in the end, what gives the agricultural 
divergence examined here much of its historical significance.  For this
particular Article, the relative lack of managerial farming in China is an
end-point, something that needs to be explained.  Within the broader 
literature on China’s relative decline, on the other hand, it is one of several 
starting points. This Article does, at least, demonstrate that laws and
institutions are highly important to any serious study of Chinese or
English economic history—but perhaps in less obvious ways than many
scholars have previously assumed.366  Chinese and English property rights
shared broad similarities in terms of private ownership and alienability,
but, as the saying goes, the devil is in the details.
 364. WRIGLEY, supra note 3.
365. See discussion supra pp. 159–62; see also discussion infra p. 164. 
366. Some have used the example of China’s recent economic boom to argue that 
traditional Western notions of “private property” may not be necessary for robust 
economic growth. See Upham, supra note 1; Clarke, supra note 1.  A closer inspection 
of their arguments suggests that these scholars are arguing that we need to change our 
idea of what constitutes an efficient property rights regime, not that “property rights do 
not matter.”  Our arguments here agree with this sentiment.
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